Strategic Preemption or Imperial Overreach? The Cases of Venezuela and Greenland

By Anil Madan

In 2019, more than six years ago, Donald Trump was asked about his interest in acquiring Greenland. He said: “Denmark essentially owns it. We’re very good allies with Denmark. We protect Denmark like we protect large portions of the world. So, the concept came up and I said, ‘Certainly I’d be.’ Strategically it’s interesting and we’d be interested but we’ll talk to them a little bit. It’s not number one on the burner I can tell you that.”

He went on to say: “Well a lot of things can be done. Essentially, it’s a large real estate deal. A lot of things can be done.”

Denmark is a member of NATO; ergo, so is Greenland. In fact, the US operates its missile warning and space surveillance commands from Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland.

 US-Venezuela. Pic – SpecialEurasia

At that time, back in 2019, as if formulating a rationale for relieving Denmark of a burden, Trump claimed that ownership of Greenland was “hurting Denmark very badly because they’re losing almost $700m a year carrying it. So, they carry it at a great loss and strategically for the United States it would be very nice and we’re a big ally of Denmark, we protect Denmark and we help Denmark and we will.”

Five years later, in December 2024, just a month before his swearing-in to a second presidential term, designs on acquiring Greenland resurfaced as a national security issue. In a post on his social media platform, he wrote “for purposes of National Security and Freedom throughout the World, the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.”

Greenland’s leadership responded that the semiautonomous territory is “not for sale.”

Almost one year into Trump’s second term as President, the mere real estate deal has become a national security obsession and he said: “We have to have it” for “national protection,” and on Jan. 9 this year, he threatened that if America cannot acquire Greenland “the easy way” then it would get it the “hard way.”

Denmark and Greenland sent their foreign ministers for a high-level meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Vice President Vance also attended. The result was a “frank and constructive” exchange. That is diplomatic-speak for an agreement to disagree. Indeed, Denmark’s foreign minister, Lars Loekke Rasmussen said after the meeting that the US and Denmark still have “still have a fundamental disagreement, but we also agree to disagree.”  Nothing has been resolved; while the US maintains its interest in acquiring Greenland, both Denmark and Greenland remain opposed.

The meeting took place against the backdrop of Trump’s statement that “We are going to do something in Greenland, whether they like it or not, because if we don’t do it, Russia or China will take over Greenland, and we’re not going to have Russia or China as a neighbour.”

The Monroe Doctrine

Following the US action in Venezuela when its Maduro was captured and Trump declared that the US was “in charge” of Venezuela and would be running it, in a follow-up meeting with American business executives, he offered a similar rationale: “If we didn’t do this, China would have been there, and Russia would have been there. Maybe they both would have been there together.”

The Trump administration has also justified its action against Venezuela as a law enforcement operation against Maduro for narcotics trafficking, as well as recoupment of oil assets seized from American companies by nationalization.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed the national security concerns in words reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine: “We’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors and rivals of the United States.”

On January 3, 2026, Trump touted the doctrine as a continuation of America’s foreign policy. Ousting Maduro was justified also because Venezuela was “hosting foreign adversaries” and “acquiring offensive weapons.”

It has also been reported that Trump administration officials have told the Venezuelans that first, the country must kick out China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba and sever economic ties. Second, Venezuela must agree to partner exclusively with the US on oil production and favour America when selling heavy crude oil. Here, we see elements of both economic interest and national security concern.

On the economic side of the ledger, it has also been reported that Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated to leaders in Congress that the US has leverage because Venezuela is on the verge of financial insolvency unless it can sell oil already in tankers.

In a recent article, I adverted to the recently published National Security Strategy document. The comments on European security and its importance to the US are telling:

“Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter…”

“Yet Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States. Transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of American prosperity. European sectors from manufacturing to technology to energy, remain among the world’s most robust. Europe is home to cutting-edge scientific research and world-leading cultural institutions. Not only can we not afford to write Europe off — doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve.”

Our goal “should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.”

As applied to Greenland, perhaps there is the suggestion that if the island breaks away from Denmark, its allegiance to NATO could be in question. Whether such concerns are valid or not, perhaps there is a strategic element involved in ensuring that the separation of Greenland from Denmark does not involve a separation from US strategic interests. Indeed, if one contemplated that there could be a fracturing of the “alliance with the United States” of certain European countries, Greenland might well be of even more defensive importance to the US. This, of course does not detract from the proposition that Greenland is critical to the control of shipping lanes as ice melt in the Arctic makes commercial shipping there a viable prospect in the not-too-distant future.

End of the NATO military alliance

Denmark’s foreign minister Loekke Rasmussen said that the security situation in the Arctic has indeed changed, and that Denmark is eager to work with the US on security improvements. On the other hand, NATO already provides the necessary framework for an agreement, and acquisition of Greenland by the US is “absolutely not necessary” to that end.

Vivian Motzfeldt, Greenland’s minister of foreign affairs, acknowledged the importance of strengthening ties with the US, and added: “but that doesn’t mean that we want to be owned by the United States.”

Trump’s response was that although he had not been briefed on the meeting: “We need Greenland for national security, so we’re going to see what happens,” Mr Trump said.

Trump has also said that acquiring Greenland “is vital for the Golden Dome that we are building” referring to the missile defense system, and that “NATO should be leading the way for us to get it.” He added: “NATO becomes far more formidable and effective with Greenland in the hands of the UNITED STATES… Anything less than that is unacceptable.” He went on: “I’d love to make a deal with them. It’s easier. But one way or the other, we’re going to have Greenland.”

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said that an American military move to seize control of Greenland would amount to the end of the NATO military alliance. It is not clear whether this is meant as a declaration that Denmark would withdraw from NATO. Certainly, the argument that Article 5 of NATO charter would be invoked does not hold water since the charter does not contemplate that a NATO member would attack another NATO member.

And one could argue that Greenland is critical for rare earth minerals that are now all but controlled by China.

It may well be that the US can get all the access to Greenland that it desires by agreement and a merger of the island with the US is not needed. On the other hand, governments can terminate agreements and who knows what the relative strength of the US and China will be fifty years hence.

One can frame the intervention in Venezuela as a strategic move to secure America’s strategic interest in stabilizing the world’s oil supplies and limiting Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in Latin America. And one can view the Greenland issue in purely strategic terms but its economic implications for worldwide commerce as shipping across the Arctic lanes grows are unmistakable.

So, are these moves merely economic imperialism, or strategic security calculations? At this point, we have to say that both elements are at work. Whether these turn out to be good business deals remains to be seen. In terms of national security, the challenges of a surging China, coupled with aggression from Russia and Iran, are unpredictable.

Cheerz…
Bwana

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 16 January 2026