The Unexpected Winner of the Gulf Crisis

London Letter

By Shyam Bhatia

Every geopolitical crisis produces an unexpected beneficiary. In the emerging Iran-Gulf settlement, that country may well be Pakistan.

Once viewed in Washington largely through the narrow lens of terrorism, instability and nuclear proliferation, Pakistan has quietly repositioned itself as one of the few states able to speak simultaneously to Tehran, Washington, Beijing and the Gulf monarchies. That access now carries value.

The Unexpected Winner of the Gulf Crisis. Pic – YouTube

As the long-running confrontation over Iran’s nuclear ambitions inches toward a fragile diplomatic conclusion, Pakistan is discovering that its greatest strategic asset may not be economic strength or military superiority, but ambiguity itself.

For decades, Islamabad occupied an awkward place in global diplomacy — too important to isolate, too problematic fully to trust. Its military establishment cultivated relationships across ideological divides: with China and the United States, Sunni Gulf monarchies and revolutionary Iran, Islamist networks and Western intelligence services. What once appeared contradictory increasingly looks, in today’s fractured geopolitical landscape, like strategic versatility.

The irony is striking.

Pakistan was once associated with one of the most controversial episodes in nuclear history. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the architect of Pakistan’s atomic programme, built what investigators described as a vast proliferation network supplying centrifuge technology and expertise to countries including Iran and Libya. Pakistan’s designs helped shape the early infrastructure of Iran’s enrichment programme itself.

At the time, Pakistan was depicted internationally as a dangerous nuclear middleman — a state operating in the shadows of international legality.

Yet history has a habit of recycling strategic liabilities into diplomatic assets.

Today, Pakistan’s deep historical familiarity with Iran’s nuclear establishment, combined with its long border and layered political ties with Tehran, gives Islamabad something few countries possess: credibility of access. Not moral credibility perhaps, but operational relevance.

That distinction matters enormously in modern diplomacy.

The United States may trust Britain more, but Britain cannot mediate with Iran independently because it is seen as inseparable from Washington’s strategic posture. India, despite its growing global stature, is viewed in Tehran through the prism of its increasingly close relationships with both the United States and Israel.

Pakistan occupies a different diplomatic space. It is close enough to Washington to be useful, sufficiently connected to Tehran to remain credible, and deeply embedded in Gulf security structures through decades of military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

In moments of regional tension, such positioning becomes valuable.

The symbolism surrounding recent contacts between Washington and Pakistan’s military leadership has therefore been hard to ignore. Donald Trump has repeatedly referred to Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, as “my favourite field marshal”, while describing him as an “exceptional man” and a “great fighter.”

The language matters. Trump has often publicly scolded NATO allies and traditional Western partners. Pakistan’s military leadership, by contrast, is now being spoken of in terms of personal trust and strategic usefulness.

That diplomatic relevance is increasingly translating into leverage.

Recent reporting by the Financial Times described Pakistan and Qatar intensifying efforts to broker a US-Iran understanding and prevent renewed conflict in the Gulf. At the same time, US-based news outlet Axios reported that Munir travelled to Tehran as part of what it described as a final attempt to secure a peace framework between Washington and Tehran.

One leading London daily newspaper observed that “the relationship Munir built with Trump has made Pakistan uniquely qualified to mediate peace talks between the United States and Iran.” The formulation may sound dramatic, but it captures an important geopolitical reality: Pakistan remains one of the few countries able to maintain meaningful channels with all sides simultaneously.

Ironically, Pakistan’s long habit of operating in diplomatic grey zones — once regarded as evidence of duplicity — may now be yielding strategic dividends. Countries trusted by nobody rarely mediate crises. Countries trusted a little by everyone sometimes do.

None of this means Pakistan has suddenly resolved its structural problems. Its economy remains fragile. Political instability persists. Militancy has not disappeared. Nor does diplomatic relevance automatically translate into long-term strategic success.

But geopolitics does not always reward virtue. It rewards usefulness.

India remains economically and strategically far stronger than Pakistan. Yet diplomacy is not simply a hierarchy of GDP or military spending. In certain crises, access outweighs scale. Pakistan’s enduring relationships with Tehran, Gulf elites and sections of the American security establishment give it channels that few others possess.

For Islamabad, this represents a quiet but important rehabilitation after years of international marginalisation.

The broader lesson may be even more significant. In an increasingly multipolar world, countries capable of navigating between rival power centres are acquiring renewed importance. Pakistan has spent decades cultivating precisely that role — balancing America and China, Sunni monarchies and Shia Iran, military alliances and strategic ambiguity.

For years, that balancing act appeared unstable and even dangerous. Today, it may be paying dividends.

Pakistan’s influence does not arise from moral authority or economic dynamism. It arises from access — cultivated over decades in the shadowy intersections of military power, nuclear politics and regional diplomacy.

In the Gulf crisis now inching toward resolution, access may prove more valuable than respectability.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 29 May 2026