Trump in Beijing: Power Theatre and the Shifting Centre of Gravity

The present moment underscores a broader truth of contemporary geopolitics: engagement with China is no longer optional for most of the world

Diplomacy

By Vijay Makhan

Donald Trump returns to Beijing at a moment of profound geopolitical uncertainty. Nearly half a century after Richard Nixon’s historic opening to China, the world’s two largest powers meet again amid tariff wars, tensions over Taiwan, instability in the Middle East and the continued erosion of multilateralism. Yet this time, Trump encounters a China far stronger, more confident and more assertive than the one he first visited in 2017.

Donald Trump arrived in Beijing this week for his second visit to China, following his earlier state visit in November 2017.  Unlike that earlier encounter, he now confronts a China that is economically stronger, geopolitically more assertive and increasingly confident of its place in a changing international order.

The visit itself carries considerable historical significance.

The first sitting American President to visit China was Richard Nixon in 1972, in what became one of the defining geopolitical turning points of the Cold War era. That opening eventually paved the way for the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1979 under President Jimmy Carter.

‘Trump has been received with all the honours due to the President of a superpower. China understands the importance of symbolism, protocol and political theatre. But beneath the pageantry, Beijing is also quietly projecting the message that China cannot be intimidated into submission…’ Pic TimesNow

Central to that normalisation process was the recognition of the “One China” policy as reflected in the Second Joint Communiqué signed in January 1979 — a framework later reaffirmed under President George H.W. Bush despite recurring tensions over Taiwan and broader strategic competition.

Nearly five decades later, the importance of maintaining stable relations extends far beyond the interests of the two powers themselves. In an increasingly fragile global environment marked by war, economic uncertainty and strategic fragmentation, stability between the US and China has become a matter of global concern.

Interestingly, this visit is not expected to be an isolated encounter between the two leaders. Current indications suggest that Donald Trump and Xi Jinping may meet three more times over the course of the year — a summit linked to Xi’s expected visit to the United States ahead of the G20 meeting to be hosted there, and later again in China during the APEC summit.

This succession of high-level contacts is itself revealing. For all the tensions, tariff disputes, strategic mistrust and rhetorical exchanges that now characterise Sino-American relations, both powers appear acutely aware that a complete breakdown in communication between them would carry profound risks equally for the wider international system.

At a time when global markets remain fragile, conflicts continue to simmer across several regions, and multilateral institutions are increasingly weakened, the management of relations between the world’s two largest powers has become a matter of global strategic importance.

This does not mean that rivalry is diminishing. Far from it.

Rather, what appears to be emerging is an uneasy but necessary coexistence between two powers locked simultaneously in competition, interdependence and strategic caution.

And in many respects, China enters this summit believing it has already achieved an important political objective. It did not bend!

For months, Washington intensified pressure on Beijing through tariffs, restrictions on advanced technologies, increasingly confrontational rhetoric, and repeated warnings over Taiwan. Yet China neither capitulated nor allowed itself to be drawn into the kind of rhetorical escalation favoured by Trump.

Indeed, one of the more striking features of this confrontation has been the contrast in political style between the two leaderships. Trump has continued to rely on public pressure, improvisational declarations and provocative remarks — not only toward China but toward allies and adversaries alike. His recent comment suggesting that Venezuela could become the “51st state” of the United States only reinforced perceptions abroad of an increasingly erratic and transactional American foreign policy.

Beijing, by contrast, has remained remarkably restrained.

Xi Jinping has been economical in public comments regarding both Trump and the United States. China’s responses have generally come through institutional channels, calibrated diplomatic statements, economic countermeasures and strategic positioning rather than emotional public exchanges.

This difference is not insignificant. In much of Asia, restraint is often associated with confidence and strength. Public humiliation of an interlocutor is generally avoided, particularly at the highest levels of statecraft. Trump has therefore been received with all the honours due to the President of a superpower. China understands the importance of symbolism, protocol and political theatre.

But beneath the pageantry, Beijing is also quietly projecting the message that China cannot be intimidated into submission.

The timing of the visit itself is revealing. Initially projected for March or early April, the trip was postponed amid mounting regional instability and the widening crisis surrounding Iran. In the intervening period, the geopolitical environment evolved in ways that arguably strengthened Beijing’s diplomatic position.

The ceasefire linked to the Iran conflict remains fragile. Washington continues to grapple with multiple crises simultaneously. American rhetoric has often appeared contradictory and volatile. Meanwhile, China has carefully preserved its strategic links with Tehran while simultaneously diversifying its energy options and positioning itself as a voice favouring de-escalation.

Equally significant has been Beijing’s continued alignment with broader Global South concerns regarding unilateralism, sanctions and the erosion of multilateral norms. China’s use of its veto at the United Nations Security Council, its refusal to isolate Iran completely, and its cautious diplomatic engagement with regional actors all reinforce its image as a power unwilling simply to follow Washington’s lead.

Interestingly, both leaders appeared publicly eager to lower the temperature, at least rhetorically.

Xi Jinping stated in unequivocal terms that the United States and China “should be partners and not rivals”, while Trump remarked that it was “an honour” to be Xi’s friend and that together they can have a “fantastic future”. Such carefully calibrated language is not insignificant in the present international climate.

Taiwan and trade will surely dominate the discussions. The tariff confrontation between Washington and Beijing has had repercussions extending far beyond the two economies themselves, affecting global supply chains, inflationary pressures, commodity markets and investment flows across both developed and developing economies.

Both sides, therefore, have strong incentives to prevent economic rivalry from spiralling into wider destabilisation. Already, both have agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open.

The Double Standards of Geopolitics

Yet, beyond the official statements and diplomatic choreography, the visit also exposes a deeper contradiction in contemporary international discourse.

When major powers engage Beijing openly, extensively and at the highest political levels, such engagement is treated as normal statecraft, a pragmatic necessity dictated by geopolitical and economic realities. The US President can travel to Beijing, praise his relationship with Xi Jinping, negotiate trade arrangements and reaffirm the importance of stable Sino-American ties, and this is largely presented as responsible diplomacy.

But when smaller and more vulnerable states maintain constructive and meaningful relations with China, the narrative often changes dramatically. They are swiftly portrayed in some quarters as having fallen within Beijing’s orbit, becoming “subservient”, strategically compromised or incapable of conducting independent foreign relations.

Small states do not have the luxury of ideological diplomacy. They survive through balance, diversification, pragmatism and engagement with all major actors. For countries such as Mauritius, maintaining cordial and mutually beneficial relations with China, India, the United States, Europe, Africa and the wider Global South is not an act of alignment or submission. It is an act of strategic necessity.

It is therefore difficult not to notice the irony.

At a time when Trump himself openly emphasises the importance of his relationship with Xi Jinping and seeks stable engagement with Beijing, one may legitimately ask where precisely are the voices that repeatedly sought to portray Mauritius as somehow having fallen into China’s fold merely because it pursued normal diplomatic and economic relations with Beijing.

Where now are the alarmist narratives so often amplified by figures such as Priti Patel, Kemi Badenoch and Nigel Farage, who persistently insinuated that Mauritius’ relations with China somehow invalidated its legitimate position on Chagos or rendered it strategically suspect?

The old adage comes irresistibly to mind: “Do what I say, not what I do.”

In reality, the present moment merely underscores a larger truth of contemporary geopolitics, that is, engagement with China is no longer optional for most of the world — including the very powers that most frequently caution others against proximity to Beijing.

Therein lies perhaps one of the defining paradoxes of our emerging international order.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 15 May 2026