The Price of Truth: When Commissions Ignore Natural Justice

Qs & As

‘The Supreme Court’s repeated reversal of the 2018 Drug Commission’s findings confirms that its procedures failed to meet the rigorous standards of natural justice’

By Lex

While Commissions of Inquiry are designed to peel back the layers of matters of grave public concern, a series of high-profile legal defeats suggests that the pursuit of truth may be overstepping the bounds of the law. From the landmark rulings involving lawyer Rampoortab and Mrs Roubina Jadoo-Jaunbocus to the definitive stances taken by the Privy Council, the 2018 Commission of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking has become a case study in the perils of procedural overreach. The courts have been clear: findings that bypass the rules of natural justice — denying individuals a formal right of reply — cannot stand, regardless of the Commission’s intent. In this week’s Q&A, Lex explores whether the current Commissions of Inquiry Act is fit for purpose, the lasting “stigma” of derogatory report labels, and whether a judicial review can ever truly restore a reputation once the court of public opinion has already delivered its verdict.

* Commissions of inquiry can play an important role in investigating matters of public concern. But they can also seriously damage a person’s reputation  —  and even end a politician’s career  —  can’t they?

Yes, that is a well-recognized and often-debated consequence of public inquiries. While commissions of inquiry are indispensable for transparency and the restoration of public confidence, they can function as potent, non-judicial mechanisms capable of inflicting profound damage on personal, professional, and commercial reputations.

* The recent judgment in favour of lawyer Rampoortab forms part of a broader pattern in which several high-profile figures have successfully challenged findings of the 2018 Commission of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking, chaired by former Justice Paul Lam Shang Leen. While the Commission was praised for the depth of its work, both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council have ruled that parts of its report exceeded legal limits and infringed upon individual rights. Does this point to the need for stronger procedural safeguards in commissions of inquiry?

The judgment in favour of lawyer Vikash Rampoortab, delivered by the Supreme Court of Mauritius on April 30, 2026, ordered the removal of six specific points from the 2018 Commission of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking report, chaired by former Justice Paul Lam Shang Leen. The Court found that these elements did not respect the principles of natural justice, as the lawyer was not given the opportunity to respond to certain claims before they were published. This ruling fits into a broader, ongoing trend where legal figures challenged by the 2018 report have successfully applied to the Supreme Court to have findings against them removed.

The need for stronger procedural safeguards in Commissions of Inquiry (COI) in Mauritius is a critical issue, primarily driven by the potential for these bodies to cause significant damage to the reputation of individuals before they have been formally charged or tried in a court of law. While commissions are essential for investigating matters of public importance, they have historically lacked the robust procedural protections necessary to protect witnesses and implicated persons.

* There was also the earlier ruling by Chief Justice A. Caunhye and Judge N. Devat in the judicial review brought by Mrs Roubina Jadoo Jaunbocus. The Court found that the Lam Shang Leen Commission “failed to act in conformity with the rules of natural justice and the requirements of fairness” in dealing with her in its report and ordered that the relevant paragraph be disregarded. What is your assessment of that judgment?

Natural justice in a Commission of Inquiry ensures procedural fairness during investigations, requiring that proceedings are impartial, transparent, and that implicated individuals have a proper opportunity to respond to evidence. These principles are essential for ensuring that reports are both accurate and legally sound.

Roubina Jadoo, who was accused by the commission (led by Paul Lam Shang Leen) of conducting “unsolicited visits” to prisoners, acting as an intermediary for drug trafficker Kamasho, and interacting with kingpin Veeren Peroomal, successfully challenged the findings of the 2018 Commission of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking in the Supreme Court. She filed for judicial review, alleging breaches of natural justice and the Commissions of Inquiry Act, arguing that she was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses or confront the documents used against her.

* Doesn’t the law require that if a Commission intends to make a damaging finding against someone, that person must first be confronted with the specific allegations and the evidence supporting them?

The principles of natural justice and procedural fairness require that if a Commission of Inquiry intends to make a damaging finding or report a “Finding of Misconduct” against an individual, that person must be afforded a fair opportunity to respond to the allegations and the evidence against them. This requirement ensures that the individual can address any relevant, credible, and significant evidence that could influence the Commission’s final report.

Commissions are bound by the common law duty to act fairly, which includes the “hearing rule,” granting a person the chance to answer the case against them. Specifically, an individual must receive reasonable notice that an adverse finding might be made and be fully informed of the specific issues at hand. To ensure a robust defence, the person must also have the opportunity to give evidence, produce relevant documents, and — where appropriate — cross-examine witnesses to rebut the allegations.

 * It appears that a recurring defence by such Commissions has been that they were merely making “comments” or “recommendations for further inquiry,” which are generally not open to judicial review. But what happens when those “comments” are serious enough to damage a person’s reputation or career?

When Commissions of Inquiry leverage their status to issue “comments” or “recommendations” that inflict serious reputational damage or derail a career, the defence that they are immune to judicial review is increasingly challenged in court. While such bodies possess broad investigative powers, they are not above the law and must strictly comply with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
Even when a report is technically non-binding, courts can — and do — review them if they breach procedural fairness or exceed their specific mandate. If a commission reaches adverse conclusions without providing the implicated party a fair opportunity to respond, courts may rule those findings unlawful.
Furthermore, when an inquiry’s “comments” evolve into a de facto “public finding of guilt,” they transcend mere reporting and create a “stigmatizing effect.” It is precisely this potential for lasting personal and professional harm that triggers the necessity for judicial oversight.

* Given that the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down findings of the 2018 Drug Commission —  not necessarily because of the evidence itself, but because of breaches of natural justice — does this suggest that the Commission may have prioritised public exposure over the strict legal safeguards required to sustain such findings?

The repeated striking down of findings from the 2018 Commission of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking by the Supreme Court of Mauritius indicates that the Commission’s procedures failed to meet the rigorous standards of natural justice.
While these reversals do not necessarily undermine the raw evidence gathered, they strongly suggest that, in its pursuit of tackling drug trafficking, the Commission prioritised expeditious findings and public exposure over the strict procedural safeguards mandated by law.

* In light of the Privy Council’s ruling in Pyaneandee and the recent Rampoortab judgment, is there now a case for reforming the Commissions of Inquiry Act so that Commissioners  —  even former judges  —  are legally required to give individuals a formal right of reply before publishing a final report, in order to avoid unfairly damaging reputations and triggering repeated and costly judicial reviews?

A compelling case for reform has emerged following the Privy Council’s ruling in Pyaneandee and the Rampoortab judgment. Both decisions underscore that findings impacting an individual’s reputation demand strict adherence to the principles of natural justice. Crucially, this includes a formal right of reply prior to the publication of a report — a requirement that remains absolute regardless of the Commissioner’s prior judicial background.

* When a court orders that derogatory labels such as “Black Sheep” be disregarded years after a report has already been made public, can the legal system truly restore the damaged professional reputation of a barrister or attorney? Or does the public nature of such reports create a lasting prejudice that no later judgment can fully erase?

While a court order to strike out derogatory labels — such as “Black Sheep” — provides a vital legal remedy, it can rarely fully restore a barrister’s damaged professional reputation. The harm inflicted by a public, often sensationalized, report is frequently permanent and difficult to erase.

Even when a court mandates the removal of a statement, the information has typically already permeated the public consciousness, making it nearly impossible to fully expunge the stigma from public opinion.

* While judicial review proceedings may clear an applicant’s name in relation to a Commission’s report, can other authorities — such as the FIU or the Bar Council — still carry out their own independent investigations if they believe there are sufficient grounds to do so?

While judicial review proceedings may clear an applicant’s name in relation to a Commission’s report, other authorities — such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) or the Bar Council — retain the power to carry out their own independent investigations if they believe sufficient grounds exist.

Statutory bodies like the FIU (under the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002) and the Bar Council operate under their own distinct legal mandates to investigate money laundering, financial crimes, or professional misconduct. A judicial review might quash a Commission’s finding based on procedural flaws — such as a breach of natural justice — but this does not necessarily preclude a regulatory body from acting on the underlying facts or separate evidence.

These institutions possess the autonomy to pursue their own disciplinary or investigative processes, provided they adhere to their own governing statutes and procedural requirements.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 15 May 2026