“It is a fundamental principle of political patronage that the victorious party rewards its own supporters, not those who opposed it”

Qs & As

Appointments of Senior Officials and Political Nominees

By LEX

Political appointments to key public offices, such as those for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and parastatal bodies, are a contentious issue in many democratic governments. While such appointments can be a useful tool for a newly elected government to implement its agenda, they can also raise serious concerns about cronyism, meritocracy, and the independence of state institutions. The debate often centres on whether political trust or professional competence should be the primary criterion for selecting these officials. Lex examines the issues at stake in this matter.

* The new Alliance du Changement government has not yet established the Senior Officials Appointment Committee it promised in its 2025-2029 programme. This committee was intended to recommend heads for major public institutions, but appointments have continued to be made without it. It is not known whether the Government has revised its policy regarding this Committee, but one wonders whether the pros and cons of having such a Committee were properly assessed. How do you see it?

According to a recent radio commentary by Harish Chundunsing, the government has become ensnared in a “trap of its own making,” a direct result of promises made during its election campaign. Any administration, regardless of whether it operates under a Westminster or federal system, is expected to appoint its own trusted advisers following an election victory. No government in its right mind would ever appoint individuals who supported the very regime it just removed from power. This brings a critical question to the forefront: could an independent Appointments Committee be relied upon to select candidates who would command the full trust of the new government?

* Could it be said that the current government’s reform agenda on appointments faces a number of legal and political constraints, primarily stemming from constitutional provisions and established practices? Or is it rather a case of an absence of political will to enact fundamental change?

It is not a big deal to set up an appointments committee. The real challenge is deciding who would appoint its members and which individuals would be chosen. This is a sore issue, as it raises questions about how independent the committee would be from the government and to what extent it would be guided solely by meritocracy and competence.

* Successive governments, of whatever political persuasion, usually appoint their own people to head or sit on the boards of State-Owned Companies, parastatal bodies, cultural centres, or speaking unions — typically as rewards for political or financial backers, or as investments for future support. That has been a constant for decades, and it is unlikely to change, however many people may disapprove of such nominations. Would you agree?

It is an undeniable reality that in the aftermath of a general election, many who have dedicated themselves to a winning party’s campaign expect to be rewarded with a position within a public institution. It is a fundamental principle of political patronage that the victorious party rewards its own supporters, not those who opposed it. To be realistic, people can disapprove of this system, but it is highly unlikely to change, regardless of which party is in power. Those who criticize this practice should be prepared to explain how they would act differently in the same situation.

* There is a strong case for making appointments strictly on merit for positions like CEOs and board members of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that operate commercially, such as Air Mauritius and Mauritius Telecom. This also applies to parastatal bodies like the CWA, CEB, and ICTA, which require competent individuals who can add value to these organizations. A Senior Officials Appointment Committee would certainly help in these cases, wouldn’t it?

What, after all, is merit? And what do we truly mean when we speak of meritocracy?
These terms are often invoked, but rarely with a clear grasp of their practical implications.
Can genuine merit be measured in the span of a brief interview before an appointments committee? At best, one might imagine a written examination for applicants — but even then, who decides the format, who conducts it, and who guarantees its fairness? Whatever the system, questions and criticisms are bound to follow.
* While the Alliance du Changement has pledged to reduce political appointments, the appointment of boards of directors and CEOs of SOEs and parastatal bodies remains a powerful tool of political control. It would take strong political will from all alliance partners to resist this entrenched practice. Do you share that view?

It’s not just about maintaining political control; it’s also about appointing people who can be trusted and who will not betray the government. It should be remembered that most parastatal bodies are funded by public funds, so it is normal for the government to have some measure of political control over them.

* While ministers in the UK often appoint individuals to the boards of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other public bodies, a practice that has raised concerns about cronyism, the system in the US is different. There, the President has the power to nominate thousands of high-level officials, including cabinet members and judges. However, these appointments require confirmation by the Senate, a system designed to be a check on presidential power. This process, while a safeguard, often becomes highly politicized. What’s your take on that?

Both the Westminster and U.S. systems of government have distinct ways of appointing key officials, reflecting their differing structures and philosophies.
In the Westminster system, ministers appoint political advisers to provide partisan support and manage the government’s agenda. These advisers are temporary, politically appointed staff, separate from the impartial civil service, and are typically supporters of the winning party.
In the United States, the Appointments Clause of the Constitution empowers the President to nominate public officials. While the Senate must confirm certain principal officers (such as ambassadors and Cabinet secretaries), Congress can, by law, allow the appointment of “inferior” officers to be made by the President alone, or by courts of law or heads of departments.

* Singapore’s system for public appointments emphasizes meritocracy. Independent commissions oversee civil service and public body appointments to ensure they remain professional and apolitical. This approach is said to reduce reliance on political patronage. Would implementing such a system in Mauritius be a tall order?

One cannot compare the situation of Singapore with that of Mauritius. The appointment of advisers or individuals to chair parastatal bodies involves different considerations.

Mauritius is a complex, multicultural society where any government or prime minister must grapple with issues of race, caste, minorities and majorities, religion, social and cultural bodies, and other lobbyists. All these considerations, which are part of an election campaign, do not disappear after the election. They permeate the whole structure of government and influence the way people are appointed.

In this environment, appointments are not solely based on a person’s merit or professional qualifications; they are also a tool for maintaining political and social stability and balancing the interests of different groups within the country.

* By contrast, the Constitution of Mauritius does not grant the Prime Minister sole authority to appoint individuals to government posts. All appointments are made either by the President or the Public Service Commission, based on the Prime Minister’s advice or recommendations. This means our Constitution ensures that no single individual, including the Prime Minister, has absolute power over government appointments; the PM’s role is that of a key advisor to the President, not the sole decision-maker. Would that be a fair reading?

Even when a president makes appointments on the Prime Minister’s recommendation after consulting with the leader of the opposition, the ultimate power of appointment rests with the Prime Minister. The consultation process is often a formality, is designed to give the impression of an independent appointment. This is a common political artifice that the public shouldn’t mistake for true independence.

 * The preceding point outlines what the Constitution provides, but in practice the Prime Minister usually has his way — whatever the President’s opinion — when it comes to appointments such as the Commissioner of Police. It is unlikely that any Prime Minister would relinquish the right or authority to “advise” the President on his candidate for such posts – especially since this system has not served the country badly most of the time, though there may have been reservations about the previous appointment. Do you agree with that assessment?

Certain appointments made by independent commissions or other authorities still require the approval or consultation of the Prime Minister.

Under Section 91 of the Constitution, the power to appoint individuals to offices in the disciplined forces, including the Commissioner of Police, is vested in the Disciplined Forces Service Commission. However, appointments to the office of Commissioner of Police must be made after consultation with the Prime Minister.

Similarly, Section 77 of the Constitution stipulates that the Chief Justice shall be appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister.

The same goes for the appointment of our representatives abroad by virtue of section 87 of the Constitution “The power to appoint persons to hold the offices of Ambassador, High Commissioner or other principal representative of Mauritius in any other country or accredited to any international organisation and to remove such persons from office shall vest in the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.”

By virtue of section of the Constitution, “Before any appointment is made to the office of Secretary to the Cabinet, of Financial Secretary, of a Permanent Secretary or of any other supervising officer within the meaning of section 68, the Public Service Commission shall consult the Prime Minister and no appointment to the office of Secretary to the Cabinet, of Financial Secretary or of a Permanent Secretary shall be made unless the Prime Minister concurs in it.”

These provisions demonstrate that the Prime Minister’s influence extends to many key and sensitive appointments. This is considered normal, as the process is not solely about merit but also about appointing individuals whom the Prime Minister can trust.

* Appointments made by the PSC, LGSC, or even by the boards of parastatal bodies are rarely contested in court. This could suggest that recruitment exercises have been conducted with due process. Would you concur?

Many people question the true independence of the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC). For instance, the mass recruitment of local government workers before the last general election led many to doubt the LGSC’s impartiality.

Furthermore, there have been few cases where decisions made by the PSC have been overturned by either the Public Bodies Appeal Tribunal or the Supreme Court.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 29 August 2025