Who Should Elect the President?

Editorial

A Constitutional Debate for Mauritius

The passage of the Constitutional Review Commission Bill (No. VI of 2026) has brought constitutional reform to the forefront of public debate in Mauritius. While the establishment of an independent commission to review the country’s supreme law is significant in itself, a committee-stage amendment tabled on behalf of Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam has attracted particular attention. The amendment specifically requires the future Commission to examine the possibility of creating an Electoral College to elect the President of the Republic.

As a result, what might otherwise have remained a largely technical constitutional discussion has evolved into a broader debate about the distribution of state power. Supporters of the proposal view it as a timely step towards modernising the country’s democratic institutions and strengthening the independence of the presidency from day-to-day partisan politics. Critics, however, question whether such a change could have wider implications for the balance of the existing Westminster-based system and argue that any significant constitutional shift should be approached with caution and broad public consultation.

The Present Reality: The Executive’s Rubber Stamp

To understand why this proposal has generated concern among some observers, it is necessary to examine the constitutional framework established when Mauritius became a Republic in 1992. Under the current arrangements, the President is elected by the National Assembly, with the choice typically reflecting the preference of the parliamentary majority. As a result, the presidency has generally remained closely linked to the prevailing political configuration, even though the office itself is intended to stand above partisan politics.

Section 28(2)(a) of the Constitution dictates that the President shall be elected by the National Assembly on a motion made exclusively by the Prime Minister, requiring a simple majority of all members.

In day-to-day politics, this mechanism strips the Head of State of independent democratic authority. The Prime Minister holds an absolute monopoly over the power of initiative. The National Assembly does not deliberate; it confirms. Consequently, the occupant of the Château of Réduit is frequently perceived as an extension of the sitting parliamentary majority — beholden to the political fortunes and whims of the Prime Minister who put them there.

The Proposed Alternative: The Electoral College Model

The reform under consideration seeks to dismantle this bilateral arrangement by broadening the voting body. While the executive has emphasized that the final composition remains an open question for the independent Commission to resolve, the international democratic precedents cited by the government — such as India, Germany, and Trinidad and Tobago — provide a clear structural outline.

The proposed Electoral College would broaden the body responsible for electing the President beyond the National Assembly. Under the concept currently being examined, it could comprise: (1) all sitting Members of Parliament (MPs), (2) elected representatives of local authorities, including Municipal Town Councils and District Councils, and (3) elected members of the Rodrigues Regional Assembly.

From a constitutional perspective, the process for implementing such a change is relatively straightforward. Since the office and mode of appointment of the Head of State are provided for in Chapter V of the Constitution, any modification would require a formal constitutional amendment. Under Section 47 of the Constitution, such an amendment would need the support of a three-quarters majority in the National Assembly before it could be enacted.

Following the “clean sweep” of the November 2024 general elections, where the ruling alliance secured all 60 directly elected legislative seats, the government commands the numbers required to pass this change without needing to consult an opposition bench that barely exists in parliament.

The Government’s Rationale: Deliberative Modernisation

In an interview on June 4, 2026, in Le Défi, Attorney General Gavin Glover vigorously defended the government’s approach, framing it as an exercise in “deliberative democracy.” The official narrative argues that by anchoring the presidential vote in both central government and local local bodies, the Head of State will derive legitimacy from a far wider cross-section of the population.

The government argues that an Electoral College ensures the presidency belongs to the entire nation — including outer islands like Rodrigues — rather than just the prevailing legislative majority in Port Louis. This broader democratic foundation is intended to insulate the President from executive pressure, reinforcing their constitutional role as a neutral, independent arbiter of the state.

Addressing public anxiety, the Attorney General explicitly stated that “there is no executive presidency in contemplation.” The administration’s stated objective is to grant the President a wider moral mandate, not expanded executive powers. The office would remain fundamentally non-executive within the classical Westminster tradition, acting as a guardian of the Constitution rather than a rival centre of power.

Furthermore, the government rejects the notion that the late inclusion of this amendment represents a lack of transparency, pointing out that an Electoral College was a clear commitment within the Government Programme 2025–2029 endorsed by the electorate.

The Critic’s Warning: The Shadow of the “Colourable Device”

Despite these institutional assurances, constitutional legal observers and political analysts remain deeply sceptical. In constitutional jurisprudence, a “colourable device” occurs when a legislature attempts to achieve indirectly what it is legally barred from doing directly, cloaking a radical shift in the guise of an innocent or routine administrative reform.

The primary concern is that this proposal resurrects elements of the controversial “Second Republic” project of 2014. The core of the critique rests on three arguments:

The Mandate Disconnect: Critics argue that you cannot structurally alter the democratic legitimacy of an office without altering its political power. A President elected by hundreds of representatives nationwide can claim a distinct popular mandate independent of — and potentially superior to — that of the Prime Minister. This enhanced standing could easily be used to justify a future expansion of presidential powers, such as the unilateral authority to dissolve Parliament or appoint key institutional heads, thereby diluting the traditional supremacy of the Westminster system.

Bypassing the Electorate: Under Section 1 of the Constitution, Mauritius is defined as a “sovereign democratic State” built upon parliamentary supremacy. Altering the structural balance between the head of government and the head of state changes the very nature of the Republic. Critics argue that a profound transformation of this scale should require a direct popular referendum. By framing the change strictly as a technical modification to the voting mechanism, the government can use its 75% parliamentary majority to pass the reform, effectively bypassing a direct public vote.

Partisan Consolidation: The timing of the reform cannot be separated from current political realities. Because the ruling alliance currently holds an overwhelming majority within the National Assembly and dominates local government councils, an Electoral College created under these specific political conditions would virtually guarantee that the ruling bloc controls the choice of the Head of State for the foreseeable future, locking out alternative political voices.

The Task Before the Commission

The Attorney General is correct on one fundamental point: the amendment itself does not implement an Electoral College; it places the question squarely on the agenda of the upcoming Constitutional Review Commission.

If this Commission is to command public confidence, it must look beyond immediate political pressures and thoroughly examine these long-term institutional risks. It must ask whether an Electoral College can truly enhance presidential independence, or if it will inadvertently create a competing centre of power that destabilizes our parliamentary democracy.

Mauritius finds itself at an important moment in its constitutional development. The independent Commission will have the responsibility of examining whether proposed reforms to the supreme law can strengthen the country’s democratic institutions and better reflect contemporary realities. In doing so, it will need to ensure that any changes command broad public confidence and contribute to the long-term effectiveness and legitimacy of the constitutional framework.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 5 June 2026