Mauritius Between Superpowers: The New Indian Ocean Chessboard

London Letter

Rather than fearing its strategic visibility, Mauritius has the opportunity to convert it into diplomatic strength, regional leadership and enhanced security partnerships

By Shyam Bhatia

Mauritius has long cultivated the image of a peaceful, prosperous island state, a place where diplomacy is discreet and the wider world rarely intrudes. Today, however, the world is converging with unprecedented intensity. India, China, the United States and France all now see Mauritius as a strategic anchor in a region that carries, according to the US Naval War College Review, “nearly 80 percent of global seaborne trade.”

The Indian Ocean, once treated as a peripheral theatre, has become the world’s new geopolitical frontier. Whoever shapes these sea lanes influences not just regional politics but the global economy itself. And at the centre lies Mauritius: democratic, stable, multilingual, and positioned near maritime chokepoints that matter immensely to global powers.

The most visible sign of shifting geopolitics is India’s development of new facilities on Agalega. Official explanations emphasize maritime security, humanitarian response and anti-narcotics operations. Both governments insist the project is cooperative and civilian in character. The Government of Mauritius has repeatedly stated, “There is no agreement to set up any Indian military base in Agalega.”

India’s Ministry of External Affairs supports this version, saying, “India is assisting Mauritius in the development of infrastructure on Agalega at the request of the Government of Mauritius,” and that these projects “are designed to enhance Mauritius’s capabilities in maritime security and humanitarian assistance.”

Even so, the size of the runway and the supporting infrastructure have prompted questions about long-term intent, as they undeniably extend India’s logistical reach across the western Indian Ocean.

China’s approach in the region follows its established global pattern of extending influence through infrastructure, investment and patient diplomacy. Beijing’s own defence doctrine acknowledges its interest in the Indian Ocean; the 2015 Defence White Paper notes that “the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication… has become an imminent issue.”

While China has not developed major facilities in Mauritius, it continues to view the island as an attractive partner due to its stability, legal sophistication and proximity to African markets. For Mauritius, the challenge is managing the parallel courtship of two Asian giants with different strategic cultures but overlapping ambitions.

Hovering over all strategic calculations is the unresolved question of Diego Garcia. In 2019, the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion that could not have been clearer: “The process of decolonisation of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968,” and the United Kingdom was under an obligation “to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible.”

The UN General Assembly affirmed the same year that “the Chagos Archipelago forms an integral part of the territory of Mauritius.” For several years afterwards, both London and Washington rejected these findings. In 2019, British minister Alan Duncan told the House of Commons, “The United Kingdom has no doubt as to our sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory.” In early 2020, the US State Department reaffirmed its position that “the United States recognises UK sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.”

Those positions held until 2025. In a significant reversal, London announced that it would enter negotiations with Mauritius for the return of the Chagos Archipelago, while ensuring that the United States could maintain its strategic presence on Diego Garcia under a future arrangement agreed with Port Louis.

For Mauritius, the shift represented the long-awaited recognition of its legal and historical claims. Former Prime Minister Pravind Jugnauth told the UN General Assembly shortly after the ICJ ruling that Mauritius had won “an historic victory for justice and decolonisation,” and the 2025 British reversal vindicated that view.

Even so, the details of the transfer, and the framework governing future American military access, remain under negotiation. What is clear is that Diego Garcia, long the most delicate issue in Mauritian diplomacy, is now the centrepiece of a complex but unavoidable trilateral conversation involving Port Louis, London and Washington.

The wider neighbourhood reinforces the island’s strategic exposure. In the Maldives, successive governments have swung between deep engagement with India and closer alignment with China. In Seychelles, domestic protests have complicated India’s attempts to expand its maritime infrastructure footprint. Along East Africa’s coastline, Indian training missions, American counter-terrorism operations and Chinese-funded ports overlap in sometimes uneasy proximity. Mauritius, geographically modest but politically respected, finds itself surrounded by states navigating similar pressures from larger powers.

For decades, Mauritian diplomacy has been characterised by balance, moderation and legal authority. Former foreign minister Nando Bodha once told the National Assembly, “Mauritius maintains friendly relations with all countries and does not align itself with any military bloc.”

Former Prime Minister Jugnauth reiterated the country’s core principle in 2020: “Mauritius will never compromise its sovereignty, nor will it allow its territory to be used for purposes contrary to peace and stability.” The island’s ability to maintain this posture will be tested as great-power rivalry deepens.

Yet Mauritius is not merely the object of geopolitical competition; it is an increasingly confident actor. Its legal victory at the ICJ, its steady economic governance, and its reputation as a neutral and rules-based interlocutor make it more valuable than ever to states seeking influence in the Indian Ocean. Rather than fearing its strategic visibility, Mauritius has the opportunity to convert it into diplomatic strength, regional leadership and enhanced security partnerships.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the defining arena of 21st-century power politics, one thing is clear: Mauritius is no longer on the margins. It is at the centre of an ocean that the world can no longer ignore. 

London, December 2, 2025


Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 5 December 2025

An Appeal

Dear Reader

65 years ago Mauritius Times was founded with a resolve to fight for justice and fairness and the advancement of the public good. It has never deviated from this principle no matter how daunting the challenges and how costly the price it has had to pay at different times of our history.

With print journalism struggling to keep afloat due to falling advertising revenues and the wide availability of free sources of information, it is crucially important for the Mauritius Times to survive and prosper. We can only continue doing it with the support of our readers.

The best way you can support our efforts is to take a subscription or by making a recurring donation through a Standing Order to our non-profit Foundation.
Thank you.

Add a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *