“You cannot lease out your sovereignty for a century and still claim to be the sovereign power”

Interview: Bashir Khan, UK representative for the Chagos Refugees Group

‘Mauritius must deploy an “India-China” geopolitical counter-weight, shifting from a weak bilateral negotiator to a strategic gatekeeper in the Indian Ocean’

‘US Department of Defense funded studies show that the base will become operationally unviable much sooner than most people realize’

As the UK-Mauritius agreement over the Chagos Archipelago remains stalled in parliamentary limbo and frozen by changing geopolitical tides in Washington, critical questions emerge regarding the strategy pursued by Port Louis. To gain an insider’s perspective on the legal, human, and geopolitical stakes, we talked to Bashir Khan, UK representative for the Chagos Refugees Group (CRG UK). Raised in Pamplemousses and educated at University College London, Bashir Khan has spent decades at the forefront of Chagossian advocacy alongside Olivier Bancoult. In this detailed interview, he explains how Mauritius undervalued its ocean assets, and why true decolonisation cannot exist without the right of return to Diego Garcia.

Mauritius Times: We understand that, based on your historical research into the 1965 Lancaster House constitutional talks, you have argued that past and present Mauritian political elites have made compromises that have helped prolong the dispute over the Chagos Archipelago. From your perspective, the current UK-Mauritius treaty is therefore not a diplomatic triumph but a flawed political shortcut. Could you explain the basis of your argument?

Bashir Khan: It is anything but a diplomatic triumph! I submit that this treaty is a flawed shortcut rather than a triumph based on three heavy historical and contemporary realities:

For decades, successive Mauritian political elites took a back-seat approach to the Chagos issue, prioritizing bilateral relationships and trade with the West. It was Olivier Bancoult and the Chagossian Refugees Group (CRG) who carried the cross alone, waging brutal, exhausting legal battles in British domestic courts.

Critics point out that the Mauritian state only aggressively stepped in at the international level (taking the case to the UN, the International Court of Justice, and ITLOS) once the ground had already been broken by the Chagossians’ blood, sweat, and tears.

Instead of fighting primarily for the absolute right of a displaced people to return home unconditionally, Mauritius shifted the battlefield to state territorial sovereignty. The current treaty reflects this shortcut: Mauritius gets technical sovereignty on paper and a massive lease payout, while the Chagossians remain barred from Diego Garcia itself.

Valeur du jour, there is no sovereignty, no payments, no ratification! And to add insult to injury, the President of the United States is on a free ride to insult our nation as per his unpredictable whims. The current reality on the ground validates the view that the treaty lacks immediate teeth.

The deal is stalled: following intense pressure and public condemnation from US President Donald Trump — who called the agreement an act of “great stupidity” — the UK government officially shelved the implementing legislation. The bill failed to pass the UK parliamentary session.

The UK Defence Secretary explicitly confirmed that this deal cannot go ahead without American support, and the first annual payments (averaging £101 million to £120 million) are completely frozen. Mauritius is currently left with an unratified piece of paper, no legal authority over the islands, and zero financial compensation.

A 99-year lease is, for all practical political purposes, a century. By giving the UK and US total operational autonomy over Diego Garcia, Mauritian elites essentially validated the status quo. Mauritius surrendered any right to veto military strikes, monitor nuclear storage, or stop environmental degradation within the 24-nautical-mile zone. Critics argue that Port Louis accepted a compromised version of “decolonisation” just to secure a financial transaction that has now failed to materialise.

The current political impasse strongly favours the argument that the treaty was a fragile, top-down shortcut that underestimated global geopolitical shifts. By designing a treaty that completely severed the voice of the Chagossian people and failed to secure ironclad, bipartisan US backing beforehand, the architects created a deal that the Trump administration easily put on the back burner.

As it stands, Mauritius has compromised its principles, sidelined the pure judicial fight for absolute return, and is now left waiting on London and Washington to decide if the treaty will ever see the light of day.

* As a vocal commentator, particularly on Facebook, on the UK-Mauritius deal over the Chagos Archipelago, you have argued against any agreement that relinquishes or leases back control over parts of the territory, specifically Diego Garcia. One could argue, however, that the balance of power between the UK and Mauritius does not allow our government to have the final say in such negotiations. It is ultimately a choice between a deal and no deal, don’t you think?

This touches the absolute core of the realpolitik dilemma that small island states face when confronting global superpowers. The argument that it is ultimately a binary choice between “a deal or no deal” is the central defence used by the architects of the agreement, but it is heavily contested by those who believe Mauritius held more leverage than it realized.

The two contrasting philosophies on this power asymmetry break down along distinct strategic lines:

The realist view asserts that “a compromised deal is better than no deal.” This perspective aligns with the premise that the stark balance of power leaves Mauritius with very little choice, as pure legal right in international relations rarely trumps raw military and geopolitical power.

The UK and US maintain physical possession of Diego Garcia, and Mauritius has no military means to evict them from infrastructure worth billions of dollars. While Mauritius won resounding victories at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN General Assembly, those rulings were advisory and non-binding. The UK could have chosen to simply ignore them indefinitely — much like other global powers ignore international rulings when it suits their strategic interests.

From this viewpoint, waiting for the UK to unconditionally hand over the keys to Diego Garcia was a fantasy. Securing a treaty that formally recognizes Mauritian sovereignty on paper — even with a 99-year lease attached — was seen as the only realistic way to break a 60-year deadlock, under the logic that refusing a deal leaves Mauritius with zero sovereignty, zero money, and zero resettlement.

Conversely, the principles view argues that “no deal is better than a flawed deal.” The counter-argument is that by accepting a “shortcut,” Mauritius folded just as its international leverage was peaking, turning a principled decolonisation struggle into a real estate transaction.

This argument posits that sovereignty is indivisible: you cannot lease out your sovereignty for a century and still claim to be the sovereign power. Consider a Mauritian child born during the negotiating period; that child will need to live beyond 100 years to set foot on his or her territory. By signing away operational control, Mauritius effectively legitimized the very military occupation it spent decades calling illegal. Proponents of this view argue that Mauritius did not need to rush, as holding out would have kept the legal and diplomatic screws tightening on London.

The current reality — where the deal is shelved, ratification is paused, and no money is flowing — demonstrates the danger of the pragmatic route.

If we view international relations through a lens of pragmatism, then a flawed deal that forces a superpower to sign a piece of paper acknowledging your ownership is a victory, because no deal means continuing to get ignored. However, if we view it through a lens of sovereign rights and justice, a 99-year lease is not a compromise — it is a surrender. It accepts a century-long “legal black hole” over Diego Garcia, leaving Mauritius exactly where it started: empty-handed and subject to the political whims of London and Washington.

* But even if we accept that the partial concessions made by Mauritius — or long-term military base leases — could be seen as compromising the principles of full decolonisation and international law, what else could realistically have been achieved, and how — especially when Mauritius has been negotiating from a position of weakness vis-à-vis the superpowers?

When negotiating from a position of profound military and economic asymmetry, asking what else was realistically achievable requires looking past immediate physical control to the legal and diplomatic levers Mauritius possessed. Had Mauritian negotiators rejected the binary trap of “take this deal or get nothing,” alternative strategies could have reshaped the outcome. These alternatives highlight what was achievable and the exact legal or diplomatic mechanics that could have been used to get there.

First, Mauritius could have pressed for a short-term or conditional lease instead of a 99-year commitment. This would have meant pursuing a significantly shorter lease framework — such as 20 to 25 years, similar to historical precedents or US base lease renewals in the Philippines — backed by ironclad, periodic review clauses. Negotiators could have achieved this by leveraging the United Kingdom’s intense anxiety over its reputational damage.

Between the 2019 ICJ Advisory Opinion and the 2021 and 2023 ITLOS rulings, the UK was facing systematic legal asphyxiation, finding itself expelled from international bodies like the Universal Postal Union and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Mauritius could have argued that a 99-year lease explicitly undermined the very international law bodies that ruled in its favour, offering instead a shorter transitional security lease that allowed the West to adjust its Indo-Pacific strategy without making Mauritius a permanent accomplice to an open-ended arrangement.

Second, Port Louis could have demanded upfront capitalisation and multilateral security guarantees. This approach meant securing upfront, non-refundable structural financial capital via international securitisation or an international trust, rather than settling for a vulnerable annual payment stream subject to Western domestic political shifts.

Realpolitik dictates that the US and UK are not the only stakeholders in the Indian Ocean. Mauritius could have formalised multilateral alignments by incorporating India as a physical co-guarantor of regional security in the treaty text. Given New Delhi’s heavy maritime security relationship with Mauritius and its immense leverage in Washington, Mauritius could have insisted that any financial compensation package be fully capitalized upfront through leading global institutions. This would have insulated Port Louis from the exact vulnerability it faces today, where a change in the US administration can instantly pause the entire process.

Third, Mauritius could have insisted on immediate co-management of environmental and sovereignty rights. This would have established true joint jurisdictional oversight inside the 24-nautical-mile zone, including the immediate right to station Mauritian environmental inspectors at the base, conduct independent radionuclide tracking, and enforce environmental laws.

Mauritius held a major card: the 2015 UNCLOS Annex VII Arbitral Award, which ruled that the UK’s unilateral establishment of a Marine Protected Area around Chagos was completely illegal because it bypassed Mauritian rights. Instead of folding this victory into a toothless, slow-moving joint commission, Mauritius could have held the line that any lease agreement was legally contingent upon the US Navy waiving its sovereign environmental immunity inside the lagoon, on the basis that a host state cannot legally lease territory for activities that actively violate its own international obligations under environmental treaties.

By simply standing firm, continuing to block the UK at every international maritime and civil aviation forum, and working hand-in-hand with Chagossian legal activists, Mauritius could have let the cost of compliance rise for London. Rushing into an unratified, easily frozen agreement proved that the “shortcut” actually achieved less than what patient, unyielding diplomatic resistance might have yielded when the UK’s isolation peaked.

* The Gulf War and subsequent US military operations in Iraq (in 1996 and 1998) and Afghanistan (after 2001) highlight Diego Garcia’s strategic importance to Washington. Given this, it seems unlikely that the US will give up its position anytime soon — unless rising sea levels eventually make the base unviable. But that is not likely to happen anytime soon, isn’t it?

The US military is highly unlikely to relinquish Diego Garcia voluntarily due to its status as an irreplaceable geopolitical “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, but the assumption that climate change will not affect the base anytime soon is scientifically inaccurate.

While complete submersion of the atoll is a long-term projection, peer-reviewed climate models and US Department of Defense (DoD) funded studies show that the base will become operationally unviable much sooner than most people realize.

The critical timeline and vulnerabilities driving this risk break down as follows: 1. The Mid-Century Habitability Crisis (2030s–2050s). The primary threat to Diego Garcia is not the land slowly disappearing underwater, but wave-driven over wash and flooding. Diego Garcia sits at a mean elevation of just 4 feet (1.2 meters) above sea level.

Groundwater Contamination (2030s): Joint studies by the US Geological Survey (USGS), NOAA, and the DoD show that as early as the 2030s, seasonal storm surges will routinely wash over the atoll. This seawater infiltration will completely corrupt the thin freshwater lenses beneath the island, rendering the local groundwater non-potable. A military base supporting thousands of personnel cannot function without vast, secure freshwater supplies.

The 2050 Tipping Point: Hydrodynamic modelling shows that storm-driven flooding events — which historically occurred once every 25 years — are projected to occur every few years by 2050. By the late 2050s, frequent seawater flooding will regularly submerge key logistics areas, threatening the runway, satellite tracking stations, and heavy equipment warehouses.

The 99-Year Lease Paradox (By 2130): The 2025 UK-Mauritius treaty grants a 99-year lease, stretching near the year 2130. Scientific data compiled by the Chagos Science Framework highlights that by the end of this lease term, the base will be structurally compromised:

* Infrastructure Failure: Fixed jetties in the military small boat basin will be entirely submerged, and the main coastal road connecting the base to the vital Space Force tracking facility will be repeatedly washed out.

Why the US Military Cares Now: Because of these timelines, the US Navy has identified Diego Garcia as one of its most climate-endangered installations globally. The Pentagon is stuck in a costly catch-22: to keep the base viable for the duration of the 99-year lease framework, the US will have to spend billions of dollars on artificial sea walls, continuous beach nourishment, massive desalination plants, and elevated runways.

Therefore, while the US will hold onto Diego Garcia for its immediate strategic proximity to the Middle East and East Asia, the physical geography of the atoll dictates that the base may naturally become an operational liability well before the 99-year lease expires.

 * Given the strategic importance of Diego Garcia to the United States and the present balance of power, what realistic options remain for Mauritius if the UK-Mauritius treaty does not move forward? Should Mauritius continue to pursue negotiations, seek further international legal or diplomatic support, or consider other approaches?

If the 2025 UK-Mauritius treaty remains permanently stalled or collapsed, Mauritius cannot rely on traditional bilateral talks and must pivot to an aggressive multilateral and transactional strategy that raises the diplomatic, legal, and operational costs for the US and UK.

Because the United Kingdom has shelved its ratification process to satisfy Washington, continuing to politely ask for negotiations is a dead end. Mauritius must weaponize its international legal victories and shifting Indo-Pacific alliances through three distinct alternative pathways.

To break the current diplomatic deadlock, Mauritius can execute a three-pronged strategic counter-offensive that transforms its legal claims into actionable geopolitical leverage.

First, Mauritius can broaden its legal offensive by targeting third-party compliance. While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion is non-binding, Mauritius can use binding international maritime law and specialized global agencies to choke the UK’s colonial administration. This includes aggressively enforcing its sovereignty at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) by legally declaring the airspace and territorial waters around the Chagos Archipelago as restricted or subject to direct Mauritian tariff, safety, and environmental regulations.

Any international commercial airline or shipping container vessel using these corridors would be forced to choose between recognizing Mauritian jurisdiction or facing international legal crosshairs. Furthermore, building on its 2015 UNCLOS victory, Mauritius can bring new litigation regarding ongoing environmental degradation and unmonitored waste tracking in the Diego Garcia lagoon. By exposing the base’s ecological practices in open court, Mauritius turns a bilateral security debate into a global environmental accountability crisis that the UK and US cannot easily ignore.

Second, Mauritius must deploy an “India-China” geopolitical counter-weight, shifting from a weak bilateral negotiator to a strategic gatekeeper in the Indian Ocean by leveraging the intense regional rivalry between major Asian powers. Mauritius should deepen its defense partnership with New Delhi, which already operates maritime assets on Agalega. By integrating India into its sovereign claims over Chagos, Mauritius can signal to Washington that Indian co-management or overwatch of regional security is the only viable alternative to a chaotic legal battleground.

Because Washington values its strategic relationship with New Delhi heavily, Indian backing for a structured Mauritian transition plan makes the Pentagon far more likely to force London to ratify a deal. Concurrently, while maintaining a delicate diplomatic tightrope, Mauritius can subtly leverage its growing economic ties with China. The mere threat of Mauritius granting future commercial port access or marine research licenses to Chinese vessels in the outer Chagos islands — such as Peros Banhos — would trigger immense strategic panic in Washington, instantly forcing the US back to the negotiating table to secure an exclusive, ironclad lease on Mauritian terms.

Third, Mauritius should pursue unilateral resettlement and direct action on the ground. If the treaty is dead, Mauritius is no longer bound by the 24-nautical-mile restriction or the ban on Diego Garcia resettlement written into the stalled 2025 text. Hand-in-hand with the Chagossian Refugees Group (CRG) and international human rights organizations, the Mauritian government should fund and launch regular, state-backed civilian and scientific expeditions to the outer islands.

Establishing a permanent, symbolic Mauritian presence — such as a solar-powered marine research station or a small fishing outpost on Peros Banhos or Salomon — would force the UK to either physically arrest peaceful citizens on sovereign Mauritian territory or stand by helplessly. The resulting global media coverage would destroy the UK’s remaining diplomatic credibility as a defender of the rules-based international order.

* Finally, what would, in your view, constitute a genuinely satisfactory settlement of the Chagos dispute — one that protects Mauritian sovereignty while also addressing the rights and interests of the Chagossian community? And, if you had to identify one fundamental principle that Mauritius should not compromise on in the Chagos negotiations, what would it be?

A genuinely just and enduring resolution to the Chagos dispute must move away from the transactional nature of the stalled 2025 UK-Mauritius Agreement. Instead, it must successfully bridge the gap between state sovereignty and human justice.

A comprehensive settlement would require a tripartite framework built on four distinct pillars:

1. Zoned Shared Jurisdiction on Diego Garcia: Rather than completely relinquishing Diego Garcia for a century, a satisfactory deal would look like the sovereign base frameworks used in Cyprus or Guantanamo Bay. The US military installation would be strictly restricted to the northern operational arm under a conditional, shorter lease (e.g., 25 to 30 years with mandatory review periods). The southern and eastern arms of the atoll would immediately revert to absolute Mauritian civilian administration.

2. The Unconditional Right of Return to Diego Garcia: Because Diego Garcia is the only island in the archipelago with functioning electricity, deep-water harbors, roads, and modern utilities, any settlement that excludes it is a human rights failure. Chagossians must have the unrestricted right to resettle on their native atoll. They can form a civilian support workforce, establish local economies, and live securely alongside the partitioned military zone.

3. A “Chagossian Trust” Financed by Geopolitical Levies: Instead of a flat-rate rent paid to the Mauritian central treasury, the financial package must be structured through a sovereign wealth trust co-managed by Chagossian representatives. Revenues should be generated through sovereign transit fees, airspace levies, and maritime licensing, creating a permanent fund to build modern infrastructure on the outer islands (Peros Banhos and Salomon) and pay direct reparations to victims of the expulsions.

4. Environmental Co-Oversight and Independent Auditing: The US military must waive its sovereign immunity regarding ecological matters. A joint environmental commission must have the legal teeth to place Mauritian and Chagossian inspectors on the base, enforce strict waste-tracking laws, and monitor the lagoon’s coral health and radionuclide levels independently.

As regards the one non-negotiable principle, if Mauritius must draw a single, unyielding line in any future negotiations, it should be the absolute rejection of any clause that decouples territorial sovereignty from the rights of the Chagossian people.

In the previous round of diplomacy, Mauritian political elites accepted a flawed political shortcut: they treated sovereignty as a real estate asset that could be won on paper and then leased back for a century, while leaving the indigenous population exiled. This compromise compromised the moral weight of Mauritius’s international legal victories.

True decolonization is not achieved when a European colonial power hands ownership to an African state on paper, only for both states to agree to keep the native population banned from their homes. Mauritius’s legal right to the Chagos Archipelago is intrinsically tied to the historical crime of the illegal detachment of the territory and the forced expulsion of its citizens.

By standing firm on the principle that Mauritian sovereignty is legally invalid without the immediate, protected right of Chagossian repatriation to Diego Garcia, Port Louis elevates its struggle from a weak bilateral transaction to an unassailable global human rights crusade. It forces the United States and the United Kingdom to choose between accommodating a peaceful civilian population or continuing to enforce a system of military segregation on the global stage.

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Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 9 October 2026

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