“The FCC shows no evidence of political pressure, and the police force also appears to be acting free from political influence”

Reforming Financial Crime Investigations: A Critical Look at the FCC Amendment Bill

By Lex

The fight against financial crime in Mauritius is at a critical juncture, with the recently introduced Financial Crimes Commission (Amendment) Bill (No. XVI of 2025) seeking to fundamentally alter the landscape of investigations. This legislation, specifically through amendments to Sections 56 and 58 of the Financial Crimes Commission Act 2023 and the insertion of a new Section 58A, aims to foster unprecedented cooperation between the Financial Crimes Commission (FCC) and the Mauritius Police Force. While the stated objective in the Explanatory Memorandum is to “empower the Financial Crimes Commission and the Police to conduct joint investigations,” the historical context of inter-agency friction and turf battle — particularly under previous anti-corruption regimes — casts a long shadow of uncertainty over its practical implementation. Lex’s analysis delves into the specific provisions of the Bill to ascertain how these changes are intended to enable or modify the interaction between the FCC and the Police, explores the mechanisms, or lack thereof, to ensure genuine collaboration and overcome past pitfalls.

* The Financial Crimes Commission (Amendment) Bill (No. XVI of 2025) aims to empower the Financial Crimes Commission (FCC) and the Police to conduct joint investigations into offenses under the Financial Crimes Commission Act 2023 through amendments to Sections 56 and 58 of the Principal Act. How do these specific changes enable or modify the interaction between the FCC and the Police?

In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, it is stated that the purpose of the Bill is to empower the Financial Crimes Commission and the Police to conduct joint investigations into offences under the Financial Crimes Commission Act. This will facilitate cooperation in the investigation of financial crimes.

* The Financial Crimes Commission (Amendment) Bill seeks to improve financial crime investigations through enhanced collaboration. However, its success is uncertain due to past inter-agency failures, often caused by turf battles and other, perhaps more significant, unknown reasons. Given this history, how will the Bill ensure the Police and FCC genuinely cooperate, thereby avoiding previous pitfalls?

The effectiveness and evolution of this collaboration remain to be seen. While the police bring valuable investigative experience, the FCC’s capabilities are equally significant. Their combined efforts promise to offer a renewed approach to tackling financial crimes.

Section 58A of the amendment clearly states: ‘Where the Commissioner of Police considers it would be in the interests of the efficient conduct of an investigation into any offence under this Act that the Police should investigate into the offence, and the offence is not already under investigation by the Commission, the Police shall investigate into the offence and give notice to the Commission thereof.’ Thus, the police must notify the Commission. Furthermore, the police should keep the Commission fully informed of the investigation’s progress, and, if the Commission requests, the police shall undertake the investigation jointly with the Commission.

This embodies the philosophy of the amending legislation. It is unlikely that under the present government there will be a turf battle between the police and the Commission, unlike the past tussles between the ICAC and other institutions, especially when Navin Beekharry was the all-powerful and untouchable overlord.

* If the FCC “requests” a joint investigation, is the Police legally compelled to agree? Conversely, if the Police “requests” a joint investigation, is the FCC compelled to agree? Furthermore, are there any specific conditions under which either party could legitimately refuse such a request?

There are no specific crimes that would fall under the sole purview of the police. However, what remains unclear is what would prompt the police to initiate an investigation into a financial crime after notifying the Commission. One section of the Bill states that where the Police are investigating an offence that appears to be related to a financial crime, and that offence is already under investigation by the Commission, the Commissioner of Police may request the Commission to undertake the investigation jointly with the Police.

* The FCC has power of arrest, unlike the erstwhile anti-corruption agency – the Economic Crime Office (ECO), established under the Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2000), which had to fall back on the Commissioner of Police for the arrests of suspects involved in economic crimes. Is this a welcome departure and a significant improvement in the fight against financial crime in Mauritius?

Under section 62 of the Financial Crimes Commission Act, the Commission may order the arrest of an individual in specific circumstances, namely where that person – has interfered with a potential witness; has destroyed or intends to destroy evidence in his possession; or has otherwise interfered with the investigation. The Commission has no power to arrest an individual suspected of having committed a financial crime. This power vests with the police who can arrest an individual if the Commission so requests.

* What are the internal and external accountability mechanisms in place for the FCC concerning the exercise of its arrest powers and investigative conduct, and how do these mechanisms compare to those governing the Mauritius Police Force?

Before exercising its limited powers of arrest, the FCC must have reasonable suspicion that an offense has been committed. The same principle applies to suspicion in matters of financial crimes; this is a constitutional principle. Accountability for such arrests resides in the court’s power to assess their lawfulness. Even where an arrest is justified, the court retains the power to release the arrestee on bail, subject to certain conditions.

* Given that both the FCC and the Police possess the power of arrest, what specific protocols will govern which agency conducts the arrest, detains the suspect, and manages post-arrest procedures in joint investigations?

The FCC has no power to arrest an individual for a financial crime itself. Its arrest powers are limited to specific circumstances, namely where that person has: interfered with a potential witness; destroyed or intends to destroy evidence in their possession; or otherwise interfered with the investigation.

* Given that both the Commissioner of Police and the FCC are involved, is there a potential for political or external influence to impact decisions regarding joint investigations, especially if high-profile cases are involved?

Since the new regime came to power, there’s no evidence whatsoever that the FCC has been subjected to or acted under political pressure. What’s more, the police force also appears to be exercising greater caution, seemingly free from political directives or influence.

* From a legal perspective, are there any ambiguities or potential loopholes in the new Section 58A that might lead to legal challenges or hinder its effective implementation?

Section 58A (3) reads: “Where the Police is investigating into any offence that appears to be related to a suspected offence under this Act and the offence is already under investigation by the Commission, the Commissioner of Police may request the Commission to undertake the investigation jointly with the Police.”

It appears that, under Section 58A, the police may be able to undertake an investigation into an offense even if the same offense is already under investigation by the Commission.

That seems odd. It is to be hoped, in the name of good governance and effective management of financial crimes, that before the police start an investigation, they ensure the offence is not already under investigation by the Commission.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 25 July 2025