Scrutinizing Conflict of Interest: The MedPoint Missions and Mauritian Law

Qs & As

‘There is no need for any reform. The law is there. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any law hinges on the ethical conduct and personal integrity of individuals’

By Lex

The issue of conflict of interest in Mauritius has come under renewed scrutiny following a parliamentary exchange concerning Mr Navin Beekarry, former Director General of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and later the Financial Crimes Commission. In response to a question from MP Roshan Jhummun, the Prime Minister confirmed that Mr Beekarry had travelled to London on three occasions in connection with the MedPoint case before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

These missions were approved by the ICAC Board, which Mr Beekarry himself chaired, without recusing himself from the decision-making process. The PM described this as a “blatant case of conflict of interest,” further noting that the missions continued despite the Privy Council’s refusal to hear oral submissions from ICAC. The cumulative cost of these trips exceeded Rs 1.37million. This episode has raised serious questions about the adequacy of Mauritius’ conflict of interest regulations, the accountability of heads of statutory bodies, and the mechanisms in place to safeguard public resources and institutional integrity. Lex delves into the issue of conflict of interest and examines whether the current legal framework in Mauritius is sufficiently robust toprevent such ethical breaches.

* What is the legal definition of “conflict of interest” under Mauritian law, particularly in the context of public office or statutory bodies such as ICAC, and do the Prevention of Corruption Act (now repealed) or the legislation establishing the Financial Crimes Commission contain specific provisions regulating such conflicts?

In Mauritius the offence of conflict of interest is provided by the Financial Crimes Commission Act (FCC). The Act has repealed the former Prevention of Corruption Act that had a similar provision. Section 29 (2) provides that where a public official, or his relative or associate, has a personal interest in a decision which a public body is to take, that public official shall not vote or take part in any proceedings of that public body relating to such decision. The penalty is ten years imprisonment.

A conflict of interest, legally, arises when an individual’s personal interests could potentially compromise their judgment, decisions, or actions in their professional or official capacity. This can include situations where private interests could influence their public duties, either actually, potentially, or even if it’s reasonable for others to perceive such influence. In essence, it’s a clash between requirements and interests, where personal gain or bias could overshadow the pursuit of a fair or objective outcome

* Is there a distinction in law between actual, potential, and perceived conflict of interest in the public service?

In the MedPoint case, the Privy Council explained, in relation to the then section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (now section 29 of the FCC), that avoiding situations giving rise to a conflict of interest is clearly part of the purpose of the offences created by section 13. The offences created by section 13(1) and (3) establish a wide-ranging prohibition and are committed when an official fails to declare an interest in an entity with which their public body proposes to deal.

The offences created by section 13(2) and (3), which are relevant here, establish an equally wide-ranging duty not to vote or take part in proceedings concerning a relevant decision. For instance, it is irrelevant whether the public body’s decision favours or is detrimental to the interests of the public official, their relative, or associate. These provisions aim to prevent situations in which corruption might occur. By establishing clear boundaries, they are necessarily drafted broadly and have a wide scope of application. It is crucial to keep these considerations in mind when interpreting this legislation. Ultimately, it is a matter of evidence.

* Is failure to recuse oneself from a decision in which one has a personal interest grounds for administrative, civil, or criminal liability under Mauritian law, and would a Board Chair’s approval of their own foreign mission constitute misfeasance, abuse of office, or breach of fiduciary duty in such a context?

An “interest” within section 13(2) of POCA (now section 29 of the FCC) is required to be “a personal interest.”

The Privy Council clarified that “personal” serves to limit the meaning of “interest” by distinguishing between the individual interest of a public official, their relative, or associate, and the more general interest shared by the public at large in decisions made by public officials. This interpretation aligns with and supports the objective of the provision, which is to prohibit participation in decision-making where the official, their relative, or associate has an interest that creates a conflict. There is no compelling reason to give the word “personal” a more restrictive effect.

Furthermore, the interest does not need to be financial; for instance, a public official, their relative, or associate may have a “personal interest” in the award of an honour, which would be sufficient to fall within the mischief the provision aims to address. If an interest falls within the parameters defined by the Privy Council, the official should recuse themselves.

* What enforcement bodies (e.g., the DPP, the FCC, Public Service Commission, or others) have jurisdiction to investigate or act on such matters?

The simple answer is the Financial Crimes Commission.

* Could the costs incurred in such missions be considered unlawful expenditure, and could reimbursement or disciplinary sanctions be pursued?

If Navin Beekarry participated in a decision that approved his travel and the disbursement of funds for it, he undoubtedly had a personal interest in the outcome. In such a situation, he should have recused himself from the decision-making process.

It will be the responsibility of the investigators to determine the full extent of his personal interest, and subsequently, for the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to decide whether to initiate prosecution or not.Read More… Become a Subscriber

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 16 May 2025