Who Owns the MMM?

The 1993 Ghost Returns: Paul Bérenger and the Ministerialist Split

Qs & As

By Lex

In 1993, the MMM fractured over whether a Minister’s loyalty lies with the Cabinet or the party leadership. The ensuing Supreme Court battle — pitting Paul Bérenger against frontbenchers like Prem Nababsing, Jean Claude de l’Estrac, and others — resulted in the landmark Vinod Boolell judgment (1994 SCJ 63). This “rulebook” for political associations established that a party’s legal identity and “soul” reside within its internal democratic structures, not its parliamentary seats. Defeated, the “ministerialists” launched the Renouveau Militant Mauricien (RMM) in June 1994.

Today, March 2026, the parallels are striking. Amid tensions over policy and state appointments within the Alliance du Changement, Paul Bérenger has resigned as Deputy Prime Minister. Yet, in a stark echo of 1993, all MMM ministers except Joanna Bérenger have stayed on, leaving the party technically within Navin Ramgoolam’s government.

The current crisis raises a fundamental question of authority: who truly speaks for the MMM? While the ‘stay-on’ faction currently holds the levers of power within the Comité Central and Bureau Politique, it has long been believed that the all-powerful Assemblée des Délégués remains Paul Bérenger’s ultimate stronghold. Yet, recent developments suggest this may no longer be a certainty.

In this week’s analysis, Lex weighs in on the constitutional ripples of the current political impasse, seeking guidance from the landmark judgment of Justice Boolell in 1994.

* In his 1993 ruling, Justice Vinod Boolell appeared to prioritise the authority of a party’s internal organs (notably the Central Committee and the Assemblée des Délégués) over the actions of its parliamentary wing. Does this mean an MP must follow the party, or does the role remain independent under the Constitution?

In most parliamentary democracies, an MP’s mandate is legally and constitutionally an autonomous office — often referred to as a ‘free mandate’ — rather than a subordinate of a political party. However, in modern practice, this independence is heavily curtailed by party discipline, rendering the mandate functionally subservient to party leadership in almost all legislative scenarios.

* The 1993 case affirmed the Assemblée des Délégués as the ultimate sovereign body within the party. In a situation where internal party structures are divided, does the ruling suggest that the Court will ultimately defer to the will of the delegates as the decisive authority?

Yes, courts generally defer to the decisions of political party delegates as the decisive authority in internal party matters, including the selection of candidates and the interpretation of party rules. This judicial deference is rooted in the principle of party autonomy and the voluntary nature of political associations, treating parties as private entities with the right to self-govern.

* In the context of an electoral alliance, such as the 2024 mandate won under a shared banner, where does an MP’s primary legal loyalty lie: with the alliance presented to voters or with their individual party? Does the Boolell ruling clarify this hierarchy?

An MP’s primary legal loyalty lies with their individual party rather than the broader electoral alliance presented to the electorate. While an alliance may offer a joint manifesto to secure power, the legal mechanisms for accountability — specifically anti-defection laws and party discipline — typically operate at the level of the individual’s membership in a specific, registered political party.

* If an MP justifies remaining in government on the basis of fulfilling manifesto commitments to the electorate, does the Boolell judgment support the argument that party discipline nevertheless prevails as the superior obligation?

In many parliamentary democracies — particularly those based on the Westminster system — established constitutional convention and judicial observation support the argument that party discipline (party loyalty and the whip system) serves as a superior obligation to individual manifesto commitments. This principle is grounded in the theory of representative democracy, collective ministerial responsibility, and the functional nature of party politics, rather than in a legally binding contract.

* In the absence of a formal anti-defection law in Mauritius, does the Boolell judgment effectively operate as a common law mechanism allowing a party to disown or dissociate itself from dissenting MPs?

In the absence of a formal anti-defection law, political parties in Mauritius rely on quasi-absolute party discipline and internal party mechanisms to manage dissenting MPs. While an expelled member technically retains their seat as an ‘Independent’ — as no automatic vacancy is created — the following actions are typically deployed to neutralize their influence:

– The MP is formally stripped of party support, meaning they no longer receive voting instructions or participate in caucus meetings.

– The Speaker is notified to move the MP from the party benches to the ‘cross-benches’ or the far end of the opposition/government ranks, signalling their isolation.

– The party can move to replace the dissenting member on influential Select Committees or the Public Accounts Committee, stripping them of their specialized oversight roles.

– While not a legal removal, an MP who breaks with the party that nominated them under the Best Loser System faces a profound crisis of political legitimacy, as their seat was mathematically tied to their party’s performance.

– The most potent long-term tool is the public guarantee that the individual will not be granted a ‘ticket’ (nomination) for the next general election, effectively ending their career under that party’s banner.

* If a party’s supreme body decides to withdraw from a governing alliance, would a Minister who refuses to resign be deemed, in law, to have severed their party membership under the logic of the Boolell precedent?

Based on the legal and constitutional principles governing political alliances and ministerial responsibility in Mauritius, a Minister who refuses to resign after their party officially withdraws from a governing alliance is deemed to have severed their party membership. This interpretation aligns with the principles of the democratic mandate and parliamentary convention.

While the specific legal outcome depends on national laws and a party’s own constitution, in many parliamentary democracies — especially those with robust anti-defection frameworks — such conduct is construed as “voluntarily giving up” party membership. This typically leads to formal expulsion or, where applicable, automatic disqualification from the party’s ranks.

* The 1993 ruling addressed control over the party’s name and identity. In today’s context, could that precedent extend to modern assets such as logos, branding, and official social media platforms, enabling party leadership to seek immediate legal protection?

In a modern political dispute, a judgment regarding the control of a political party’s name extends to its entire intellectual and digital identity — including logos, branding, and official social media platforms. Courts and election authorities typically treat these assets as the protected property of the legal entity. Consequently, whoever is adjudged to represent the party’s ‘true’ leadership generally gains exclusive control over its brand and public-facing communication channels.

* How does the Boolell judgment interact with the constitutional powers of the Speaker? Can a party compel or formally request the Speaker to recognise dissenting MPs as independents rather than party representatives?

A political party can formally request or initiate a process for the Speaker to recognize dissenting Members of Parliament (MPs) as independents, but the ability to compel the Speaker depends on a country’s constitutional laws regarding anti-defection and the removal of the party whip. In most Westminster systems, this is achieved through the withdrawal of the party whip, which formally notifies the Speaker that the member no longer represents the party’s interests in the House.

* Ultimately, in disputes of this nature, where should the Court’s primary concern lie: in safeguarding the stability of government, or in upholding the internal integrity and rules of the political party as an association?

In disputes concerning internal political party affairs, the Court’s primary duty is to uphold the internal integrity, statutes, and democratic processes of the party as a voluntary association. By ensuring that a party remains ‘master of its own house’ through the fair application of its own rules, the judiciary indirectly supports broader government stability and the rule of law without overstepping into the political thicket.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 27 March 2026