“Ultimately, what matters most is the unwavering integrity of the DG of the National Crime Agency”

From ICAC to NCA: Avoiding the Trap of Institutional Weaponisation

Qs & As

The announcement of the National Crime Agency marks a pivotal moment in the Mauritian fight against financial crime and high-level corruption. However, the proposal arrives in an atmosphere thick with historical scepticism. For over a decade, the shadow of the now-defunct ICAC has loomed large, often perceived as a weaponised instrument used to settle political scores rather than a neutral arbiter of justice.

The central challenge for the legislator is clear: how do we build an agency powerful enough to dismantle complex criminal networks without creating an “institutional monster” that devours the very civil liberties it is meant to protect? Lex looks into the issues involved.

* The risk of the National Crime Agency (NCA) becoming an “institutional monster”, as highlighted in political and legal debates, concern is not unfounded in light of the recent past with the former ICAC perceived as being weaponized against political opponents. What specific legislative “brakes” would be required to prevent it from becoming another “super-agency”?

To prevent a ‘super-agency’ from exceeding its mandate, we must implement legislative ‘brakes’ that focus on narrow jurisdiction. One could go for a ‘Serious Crime Threshold,’ ensuring the NCA only intervenes in high-value or complex cases. Additionally, there could be a case for a mandatory sunset clause — requiring Parliament to re-authorize specific intrusive powers every five years —  which would ensure the agency remains accountable to evolving democratic standards rather than growing unchecked.

 * There are apprehensions that by centralizing data from the Police, MRA, and FSC, the NCA risks becoming a high-power “intelligence bank” prone to abuse. Without strict oversight, its advanced surveillance tools — originally intended for complex crime — could be turned against journalists, activists, and private citizens. If the agency’s leadership is politically appointed, it faces a high risk of being weaponized by the executive to target the opposition.

Centralization can improve efficiency but threatens privacy. To prevent abuse, the law should require strict data separation and permanent audit logs, as is done in other sectors such as banking.

Every time an official accesses cross-departmental data, it should trigger an automated notification to an independent compliance officer. We should also make unauthorized access by agency staff a crime, ensuring surveillance tools are used only for legitimate investigations, not to target journalists or activists.

The protection of personal data is strictly regulated by the Data Protection Act, which mandates that any access to such information requires a formal judge’s order. To ensure the system’s integrity, unauthorized access to or misuse of data is a serious offence, severely punished under the law to deter any breach of public trust.

* As regards the appointment of the Director-General of the NCA, would you expect it to be a political appointment by the Prime Minister, or should it be best left to the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC) to ensure neutrality?

For the NCA to be truly neutral, it is argued that the Director-General should be appointed by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC) rather than the Prime Minister. Such a move is designed to remove the “patronage” element; if the head of the agency serves at the discretion of the executive, public perception will likely remain clouded by scepticism. An appointment by the JLSC aligns the DG’s loyalty strictly with the Constitution rather than a political benefactor.

Ultimately, what matters most is the unwavering integrity of the appointee and the political will of the Prime Minister and politicians to allow the agency to function without interference. In this view, institutional safeguards are essential, but they are only as strong as the character of the individuals who inhabit and oversee them.

* Given the immense power the NCA will hold, should its Director-General be granted security of tenure equivalent to that of a Supreme Court Judge or the DPP — where removal is only possible for ‘inability’ or ‘misbehaviour’ via a special tribunal — to ensure the office is shielded from ‘at will’ dismissal by the government of the day?

Security of tenure is essential. If the DG can be dismissed ‘at will,’ they are vulnerable to political pressure. By granting tenure equivalent to a Supreme Court Judge or the DPP, where removal requires a specialized tribunal for proven misbehaviour, we ‘fireproof’ the office. This allows the DG to pursue high-level corruption cases without fear of professional retaliation.

* The NCA will likely have access to “intrusive surveillance” (phone tapping, etc.). Shouldn’t the law mandate that every single surveillance act requires a warrant from a Supreme Court Judge, rather than just an internal agency authorization?
In a democracy, the power to conduct surveillance must be balanced by independent judicial oversight. Every use of intrusive surveillance should require a warrant from a Supreme Court judge, not internal approval. This ensures that surveillance is necessary and proportionate before a citizen’s privacy is infringed.

* When the Police, MRA (Tax), and FSC (Finance) share one database, a person’s entire life is visible to one agency. What ‘Chinese Walls’ or data-siloing requirements must be in the Bill to prevent investigators from browsing through citizens’ private financial lives without a specific criminal predicate?

We must avoid a ‘totalitarian view’ of a citizen’s life. One could go for a ‘Need-to-Know’ architecture: an investigator looking into tax evasion shouldn’t have automatic access to health or family records unless they can demonstrate to a Data Controller that those specific records are relevant to the crime. These ‘Chinese Walls’ should be embedded into the software architecture of the agency, not just the policy manual. One could learn from other sectors how such safeguards are put in place.

* Would it be correct for the NCA to have the power to reopen cases that were already “closed” or “discontinued” by the ICAC/FCC or the Police? If so, does this violate the principle of fairness?

To ensure accountability, there should be no statute of limitations on such actions, especially when considering how the ICAC “slept” on sensitive cases involving those in power between 2014 and 2024. Proponents of this view argue that these cases must be reopened to correct past inactions and restore public trust.

However, to maintain a fair and stable legal system, reopening cases should be the exception rather than the rule. To ensure fairness and avoid “double jeopardy” concerns, the law must incorporate a “Fresh and Compelling Evidence” test. Under this framework, a case should only be reopened if new evidence emerges that was fundamentally unavailable during the initial investigation.

* Many lawyers believe that the success of the NCA would depend entirely on whether it  remains under the DPP’s absolute control or if it becomes a separate branch under the Attorney General. How do you react to that?

The NCA must remain under the ultimate prosecutorial supervision of the DPP. The Attorney General is a political figure; the DPP is a constitutional one. If the NCA reports to the AG, there is a risk that prosecutions become a tool of government policy. Keeping the ‘investigative’ and ‘prosecutorial’ functions separate — with the DPP as the final gatekeeper — is the strongest safeguard for the rule of law.

* There is always the question of “Who guards the guardians” question: Which body is best suited to provide oversight for the NCA? A Parliamentary Committee (which may be politically biased) or a truly independent Operations Review Committee?
It would be advisable to adopt a “dual-layer oversight model”. A Parliamentary Committee is useful for budgetary transparency, but for operational integrity, we need an independent Operations Review Committee (ORC) consisting of retired judges and forensic experts. This ORC should have the power to ‘walk in’ and audit any file at any time. This ensures that the agency is held to account by experts, not just politicians.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 16 January 2026