“There is no evidence to suggest that the FCC is not acting independently”

‘Convictions depend on the complexity of the investigation and the DPP’s evaluation of the submitted files’

Qs & As

 * ‘Greater accountability in the private sector could be justified in the public interest’

By Lex

On 19 December 2025, Cabinet appointed former Chief Justice Bernard Sik Yuen as Chairperson of the Constitutional Review Commission. This appointment is a key element of the Government Programme 2025–2029, which seeks to modernise the Mauritian state by strengthening democracy, restoring good governance, and undertaking wide-ranging constitutional and parliamentary reforms.

The Commission is expected to propose electoral reforms and stronger protections for fundamental rights, including so-called “third-generation” rights such as access to healthcare, education, and a clean environment. To rebuild public trust, the programme also emphasises the independence of public institutions, the introduction of a Freedom of Information Act, and the strengthening of the Equal Opportunities Commission to promote meritocracy.

Digital rights feature prominently. Following the revocation of mandatory SIM card registration regulations, new legislation is expected to ensure that covert surveillance is strictly limited to national security concerns. The government also plans to promote media pluralism through the introduction of private television channels and to strengthen protections for sensitive personal data. Lex examines these issues — and more — in the Qs & As that follows. Read on:

* The mandate of the Constitutional Review Commission, as set out in the Government Programme 2025–2029 and reiterated in the Cabinet Decisions of 19 December 2025, is extremely broad, covering democratic institutions, fundamental rights, and governance. Given the scale of the task and the need for extensive public consultations, is it realistic to expect the Commission to complete this work conclusively within the current government’s mandate?

The intention is noble, yet the task is vast. We must wait to see how the Commission approaches its mammoth mandate. Will it be a one-man commission, or will other members be appointed? Furthermore, who will those members be?

Furthermore, I would reiterate Lex’s observation from March of this year: ‘The Mauritian Constitution, adopted in 1968, has served as the bedrock of the nation’s governance for over five decades. However, as society evolves, technology advances, and global norms shift, a critical question arises: is it time for a comprehensive re-evaluation?’

In my view, these questions remain as pertinent as ever. We must delve into the critical aspects of Mauritius’ constitutional landscape, examining the necessity for reform, the lessons offered by international precedents, and the challenges posed by technological advancements. Moreover, we must address the ongoing debates surrounding our political and institutional structures to explore whether Mauritius is truly prepared to forge a constitutional framework fit for the 21st century.

* Since the Sachs Report (2002), followed by the Carcassonne Report (2011) and proposals made by Rama Sithanen, Mauritius has struggled to reach consensus on electoral reform. 23 years later, major questions relating to Proportional Representation (PR) and the Best Loser system remain unresolved. Is it reasonable to expect the Sik Yuen Commission to meaningfully address issues such as seat allocation (First Past The Post with the Best Loser System versus a mixed FPTP–PR model), MP accountability (including a right of recall), and political financing legislation within the remaining term of this government?

It remains to be seen what representations will be made, by whom, and how the Commission will grapple with them. This process brings to mind Justice Sachs’ insightful opening lines in his report:

‘In a society as lively and politically literate as Mauritius, it is not surprising that the Commission for Constitutional and Electoral Reform should be inundated with submissions. Over a period of several weeks, we received more than seventy written memoranda and heard oral representations during more than fifty sessions.’

The historical precedent set by Justice Sachs highlights the high level of civic engagement we can expect — and which the current Commission must now prepare to manage.

* Many citizens want to know how these high-level reforms will affect their daily lives. Should we expect the Commission go beyond institutional redesign and recommend enforceable rights — such as allowing citizens to take legal action against the state when minimum standards in healthcare, education, or environmental protection are not met?

It is difficult to speculate further, as the Commission’s terms of reference have not yet been clearly defined beyond broad government policy. It is worth noting that Mauritius is a signatory to several key international conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

Despite these commitments, many of the rights enshrined in these international treaties are not explicitly reflected in the Mauritian Constitution. A comprehensive study is needed to explore how these protections can be formally incorporated. For instance, the right to privacy is not explicitly stated. Furthermore, our current legal framework regarding discrimination remains limited in scope; while the rights of women and children are protected through various pieces of legislation, they are not constitutionally entrenched.

* We often hear about exaggerated health claims by private clinics. Is there not also a case for requiring the private sector to provide affordable services and minimum standards in healthcare, as well as in education and environmental protection?

Would the Commission consider making such requirements a constitutional duty for businesses? This may, however, go too far, as private clinics and private enterprises should retain the freedom to run their businesses. However, while this might be seen as excessive by some, greater accountability in the private sector could be justified in the public interest.

* Under the previous government, several high-profile arrests were made under the ICT Act for vague offences such as “annoyance,” which were widely perceived as politically motivated. These cases sparked public backlash and renewed concerns about the misuse of cyber laws. To what extent can the Sik Yuen Commission prioritise reforming the ICT Act, removing ambiguous provisions, and aligning cyber legislation with international human rights standards while still addressing legitimate national security concerns?

The Supreme Court has already struck down certain vague provisions within the ICT Act. While it is not for me to predict exactly how the Commission will approach its mandate, it will presumably review the sections pertaining to Freedom of Expression. This is vital to ensure that the ICT Act is no longer subject to abuse and that rigorous scrutiny is applied before any individual is deprived of their liberty.

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‘The depenalisation of cannabis carries significant legal and social implications’

* Beyond constitutional reform, corruption remains a major concern. Although the Financial Crimes Commission (FCC) is handling numerous cases inherited from the previous regime, it is still unclear whether these investigations will result in convictions that can withstand judicial scrutiny. How do you assess the current effectiveness and independence of the FCC?

To date, there is no evidence to suggest that the FCC is not acting independently. Whether investigations will ultimately result in convictions depends on their inherent complexity and how the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) evaluates the completed files submitted to him.

It is important to remember that the investigation of financial crimes is exceptionally intricate, often involving significant international ramifications.

* The black economy in Mauritius is widely believed to be extensive and deeply entrenched, often reinforcing corruption. Do we currently have adequate laws and institutions to tackle the scale of the black economy? Is enforcement capacity sufficient? Or do gaps in oversight and accountability continue to allow illicit economic activity to flourish?

In any country with a liberal economy, a black economy will inevitably flourish. A black economy — also referred to as a shadow, underground, or hidden economy — comprises economic activities that are concealed from official view. This involves unreported cash transactions, untaxed labor (such as cash-in-hand domestic work), and, in some instances, the trade of illegal goods and services like drugs or smuggling.

Such an economy exists in all nations, operating outside government oversight, regulations, and tax systems. Consequently, no tax revenue is generated, which ultimately hinders the provision of government services and infrastructure.

The question remains: should we expect the Commission to address this systemic issue, or is it a separate matter of fiscal and criminal policy?

* The widespread availability of synthetic drugs across towns and villages is a growing national concern. While policing efforts may have intensified, there is doubt that repression alone can resolve the crisis. Should Mauritius move towards a broader public-health-based approach to drug policy, including harm reduction strategies and the possible depenalization of cannabis?

The depenalisation of cannabis carries significant legal and social implications, necessitating a shift in policing strategies and law enforcement priorities. Beyond the potential for increased tax revenue and the reduction of social stigma, depenalisation can fundamentally transform the criminal justice landscape.

However, these benefits must be weighed against critical public health concerns, such as the risk of increased adolescent use and the general potential for higher consumption rates. Consequently, the transition requires a robust regulatory framework designed to mitigate harm while ensuring public safety.

* In a Westminster-style parliamentary system, a Minister without Portfolio has no independent constitutional authority to set the government’s agenda or challenge the Prime Minister’s prerogatives. Such conflicts are resolved politically, not legally, and often end in discipline, dismissal, or resignation. Do you see a risk of this kind of constitutional tension arising in the current context?

A Minister without Portfolio occupies a senior cabinet position but does not oversee a specific government department. Instead, they focus on strategic, cross-cutting roles — such as coordinating major policies, balancing cabinet power, managing internal party issues, or overseeing ad-hoc projects. This arrangement grants the individual a ministerial salary and voting rights within the Cabinet, with their duties defined by the Prime Minister’s requirements rather than by statute.

In the case of a Deputy Prime Minister holding no specific portfolio, the management of their business and conduct remains a matter for them and the Prime Minister to decide. It is not expected that the Commission will establish specific guidelines for such an arrangement.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 31 December 2025