“The Ombudsman must be free from political influence

Interview: Harry Ganoo, Ombudsman

to investigate complaints fairly, highlight poor administration without fear or favour”

* ‘The Ombudsman’s credibility and effectiveness hinge on investigations being conducted objectively, fairly, and free from external pressure’

In the complex machinery of government, where power is vested and public services are delivered, the potential for maladministration and injustice is ever-present. This is precisely why independent oversight bodies are crucial – acting as guardians of fairness and accountability, ensuring that the state serves its citizens justly. In Mauritius, this vital role is embodied by the Office of the Ombudsman, often referred to as a “watchdog” for public administration. But what exactly does this moniker entail for the daily operations of government in Mauritius, and how effectively has the Office fulfilled this critical mandate over the years? In this interview with Mauritius Times, Harry Ganoo, the current Ombudsman and former Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, sheds light on the multifaceted responsibilities of his office, its enduring impact, and the inherent challenges it faces in its commitment to upholding transparency, accountability, and the rights of the aggrieved Mauritian citizen.

Mauritius Times: The Ombudsman is often called a ‘watchdog.’ What does this mean for public administration in Mauritius, and how effective has the Office been in this role over the years?

Harry Ganoo: Being a “watchdog” means the Ombudsman guards the integrity of public administration and serves as a voice for the aggrieved. In Mauritius, the Office has played a vital and evolving role in promoting transparency, accountability and fairness by investigating complaints made by members of the public whenever they allege having suffered hardship or injustice through maladministration or service failure on the part of any government officer or authority in the exercise of administrative functions.

Since its establishment in 1970, the Office has continuously conducted independent checks on the actions and decisions of public authorities, helping detect and correct maladministration.

Over the past five years, the Office has received more than 3,000 complaints, reflecting not only the efficiency and relevance of our work, but also the continued trust of citizens in our ability to provide redress. This steady volume of complaints underscores the vital role the Ombudsman plays as a reliable avenue for addressing grievances against public administration.

It is also worth noting that our intervention has resulted in amendments to existing laws, enhanced due diligence exercised by Public Officers, reviewed procedures in the service, and improved compliance with prevailing legislation, thus ensuring the rule of law and access to information guaranteed under the Constitution.

* While the Ombudsman is able to probe matters through full access to information and the right to call witnesses, its role is ultimately limited by the absence of enforcement power for its recommendations. Doesn’t this inherent limitation compromise its effectiveness in ensuring accountability?

The power of the Ombudsman, after an investigation, under Section 100 of the Constitution, is to recommend corrective measures to Public Authorities when maladministration is uncovered. Although the Ombudsman’s recommendations are not legally binding, the authority of the Office lies in its independence, transparency, and the trust it commands from the public. Where a recommendation is not implemented within a reasonable timeframe, the Ombudsman may escalate the matter and send a copy of his report and recommendation to the Prime Minister and to any Minister concerned and may thereafter make such further report to the National Assembly as he deems fit.

The law does not exempt public authorities from complying with the Ombudsman’s recommendations. While Public Authorities may present justifications for non-implementation, the burden rests on them to provide valid reasons after which the Ombudsman may reconsider the decision if warranted.

In practice, most Public Authorities cooperate fully with the Office and take corrective measures where necessary. However, despite the expectation that Authorities justify any non-compliance, delayed or refused implementation of recommendations remains a persistent issue, albeit in a few cases – as highlighted in the Annual Report 2024.

The Ombudsman’s recommendations cannot be treated as optional and to strengthen accountability, the Office is proposing legislative reform to make its recommendations more enforceable. Additionally, the Ombudsman’s Annual Report – submitted under Section 101(3) of the Constitution and laid before the National Assembly – should be a tool for parliamentary scrutiny and action. It is crucial that the National Assembly engages meaningfully with these reports and holds the Executive accountable for administrative failings, ensuring that justice and fairness are not just ideals but practical realities for all citizens.

* Another limitation of the Ombudsman is set out in Section 97(7) of the Constitution, which prevents the Ombudsman from investigating a complaint made by a citizen concerning the action of a government Minister, if the Prime Minister formally certifies in writing that the Minister acted on the basis of his or her own deliberate judgment. This appears to undermine transparency and accountability in government, especially since it allows the PM to effectively shield a Minister’s decisions from independent scrutiny, does it not?

This limitation should be considered in conjunction with Section 68 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the Minister exercises general direction and control over Government Departments while the Permanent Secretary or another Public Officer appointed by the Public Service Commission serves as the supervisor of the Department. In practice, much of the day-to-day decision-making and implementation falls under the purview of Public Officers, who are within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction and the complaints dealt by the Office are in fact the day-to-day problems encountered from dealings with public administration.

This provision also reflects the separation of powers between the Executive and independent oversight bodies. The Ombudsman is equally responsible for respecting constitutional limits while continuing to promote integrity and accountability. However, this provision does not exempt any Minister from being held accountable.

While it is argued that this constitutional arrangement creates a gap in oversight, it is to be highlighted that there are other institutional mechanisms in place, which ensure independent scrutiny of Ministers’ actions, such as the Financial Crimes Commission in cases of abuse of power or corruption, as well as mechanisms within the National Assembly – notably parliamentary questions and committees. In addition, the media also plays an important role, often exposing misconduct and prompting public pressure for accountability.

* If the Office of the Ombudsman cannot investigate a complaint against a Minister’s action, why is it important for the Ombudsman to be constitutionally independent? What risks would arise if he were not?

Although the Ombudsman is not empowered to investigate the actions of Ministers, independence remains essential to ensure impartial scrutiny of the public administration. The Ombudsman must be free from political influence to investigate complaints fairly, highlight poor administration without fear or favour, and make recommendations that promote justice and fairness. Independence also strengthens public trust, reassuring citizens that their complaints will be handled objectively and without bias.

The very credibility and effectiveness of the Office of the Ombudsman rest on the belief that investigations are conducted objectively, fairly, and free from any external pressure. If the Ombudsman were not independent, it would seriously undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the Office. Investigations could be compromised by political pressure, leading to selective accountability and a loss of public confidence. Investigations might be biased, complainants discouraged, and maladministration left unaddressed.

* Much less is heard about the work of the Ombudsman’s Office than that of the anti-corruption agencies (formerly ICAC, now rebranded as the FCC — Financial Crimes Commission). Does this suggest that we are more frequently confronted with issues of corruption and fraud than with maladministration leading to injustice for members of the public?

Not at all – the FCC and the Office of the Ombudsman have very distinct mandates. The lower public profile of the Office of the Ombudsman compared to others does not mean that issues of maladministration are less frequent or less serious. On the contrary, the statistics in the Annual Report 2024 clearly reflect the continued relevance and volume of complaints handled by the Ombudsman. As highlighted by Mr Ramawad Sewgobind, former Ombudsman of Mauritius:

“It may also be said that… what appears to be small grievances to some critics are really big problems for the vast majority of people…A retiring benefit not paid in time, a complaint to a police officer or a labour officer or any officer or Ministry or Department being unreasonably delayed, a medical report not being available… may appear small matters to those who look for sensational news, but to the persons concerned such matters are of great importance as they affect them adversely…”

The nature of complaints handled by the Ombudsman often involves day-to-day administrative failures that may not attract headlines, but which have serious consequences for individuals. It is precisely why they receive less media attention. In fact, the strength of the Ombudsman lies in addressing these “invisible” yet deeply felt injustices, offering redress where individuals might otherwise be left voiceless.

In contrast, the FCC deals with criminal matters that may involve high profile Public Officers and individuals – often prompting greater media coverage and public debate. Ultimately, while the FCC and the Office of the Ombudsman operate in different spheres – one addressing criminal misconduct and the other administrative injustice – both play a vital role in upholding public accountability and reinforcing integrity within the system of governance.

Furthermore, the confidential nature of the Ombudsman’s work contributes to its lower visibility. Section 98 of the Constitution requires that investigations be conducted in private, thereby limiting the amount of public information available during the process. However, complainants are informed of the outcomes of their cases, and summaries of own-motion or anonymous complaints are published on our website. Additionally, key cases and statistical data are included in the Annual Report.

Given the Office’s limited financial and communication resources, it cannot undertake large-scale public awareness campaigns – but this in no way reflects a lack of activity or relevance. Quite the opposite, it underscores the quiet but essential role the Ombudsman plays in upholding justice in the everyday interactions between citizens and the State.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 18 July 2025