The High Stakes of Electoral Reform

Editorial

The political tremors currently vibrating through the Alliance du Changement government have, for the moment, settled into a deceptive calm. Following a series of high-stakes meetings between Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam and his Deputy, Paul Bérenger, the immediate threat of the alliance collapse has been “defused.” However, as any seasoned observer of the Mauritian political landscape knows, a defused crisis is not a resolved one. The underlying fault lines — primarily the thorny, decades-old issue of electoral reform — remain active.

While the public discourse has been cluttered with friction over alleged scandals involving officials/advisers close to the PM and the management of the Finance Ministry, these could be merely diversions. The heart of the matter remains Paul Bérenger’s singular, career-long obsession: an electoral overhaul that incorporates a significant “dose” of Proportional Representation (PR). As the MMM leader retreats from his demand for the Finance portfolio, he has recalibrated his stance, making his continued presence in the government contingent on “correct and sincere” progress on reform. But the nation must ask: whose interests is this reform truly intended to serve?

The Prism of Self-Interest

It is a truism that a nation’s political architecture requires periodic maintenance. The government’s stated aim to consult the public on a system “adapted to the 21st century” is, on the surface, laudable. However, the history of constitutional change in Mauritius teaches an indelible lesson: every proposed reform is viewed through the prism of political self-interest before it is judged on national merit.

For the MMM, the push for PR is not merely a matter of democratic principle; it is a calculated necessity for survival. Under our current First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system, a party’s national vote share can be diluted. We have seen historic “60-0” sweeps where a winning coalition secures every seat in Parliament despite the opposition maintaining a significant portion of the popular vote. For a party like the MMM, which has seen its influence wane at successive elections, a dose of PR is more than a policy preference; it is a strategy for survival. It would guarantee a significant, permanent presence in the National Assembly, securing both influence and a clear opposition function, regardless of whether the party is in government or out. It also offers a path to escape the “tyranny of pre-electoral alliances,” allowing the party to stand alone and negotiate power post-election.

Conversely, the Labour Party’s historical reluctance is equally pragmatic. The FPTP system has traditionally favoured dominant parties, allowing them to secure comfortable governing majorities. To dilute this power by conceding seats to the opposition via PR is a bitter pill that no Prime Minister swallows easily. Thus, we find ourselves in a familiar deadlock: one partner views reform as a lifeline, while the other views it as a threat to government stability.

The Best Loser System: A Delicate Equilibrium

The most dangerous aspect of the current manoeuvring is the potential impact on the Best Loser System (BLS). Since independence in 1968, the BLS has functioned as the essential compromise that guaranteed minority representation, ensuring that the “General Population,” Muslim, and Sino-Mauritian communities felt they had a seat at the table.

Critics rightfully argue that the BLS institutionalizes communalism by requiring candidates to declare their ethnic identity. However, as journalist and political analyst Jean-Claude de l’Estrac wisely observes in this week’s interview, identity is a potent force. Abolishing the BLS in the name of a “modern” or “post-ethnic” Mauricianism, without providing a robust and guaranteed alternative for minority representation, risks creating a sense of exclusion. In a multi-ethnic society, “wounded identities” can become “murderous identities.” If minority groups — specifically the General Population and the Muslim community — perceive that their representation is being sacrificed to satisfy the PR requirements of a political party, the resulting communal friction could far outweigh any perceived democratic gains.

The Ticking Clock and the Generational Risk

Beyond the technicalities of the law, there is a human element of legacy and succession. Paul Bérenger is acutely aware that time is not on his side. If he does not secure this reform during the 2025–2029 mandate, it is highly improbable that another opportunity will present itself. His strategy appears crystal clear: to force Navin Ramgoolam into a definitive choice. Either the Prime Minister yields, allowing Bérenger to cement his place in history as the architect of a new electoral era, or he refuses, stripping the current alliance of its primary political justification.

However, Bérenger is playing a high-stakes game that carries significant risk for his own party. By remaining in an alliance without a firm guarantee of reform, he risks weakening the MMM’s identity. Such obstinacy could poison the well for the party’s rising stars, notably Joanna Bérenger and the younger guard. If the MMM is seen as a junior partner that traded its core principles for a seat at the table without achieving its central mission, it may leave the next generation with a depleted political inheritance, making the transition of leadership far more difficult.

A Realistic Timeline vs. Political Expediency

The Prime Minister has called for more time, citing the national consultation ending January 30. While some see this as a dilatory manoeuvre to exhaust Paul Bérenger’s patience, it is a necessary caution. Constitutional reform of this magnitude cannot — and should not — be rushed to settle a cabinet spat.

In any case, electoral reform should not be the exclusive preserve of politicians seeking to maximize their seat count. If the government’s consultations are merely a hollow exercise intended to provide a “credible exit” for a coalition partner, they are doomed to fail. A proper reform initiative must be broad:

1. Equal Franchise: Adhering to the “one person, one vote” principle.
2. Party Democratisation: Mandating internal democracy to prevent the rise of political dynasties.
3. Finance Transparency: Curbing the influence of “big money” on public policy.

The Constitution has served the nation well. It should not be tampered with merely to suit the narrow, short-term interests of parties that may be losing favour with the electorate.

Mauritius stands at a crossroads. We can choose to pursue a “hastily constructed amendment” to satisfy the MMM’s proportional aspirations and keep the Alliance du Changement afloat, or we can commit to a meticulous, inclusive process that strengthens our democracy for the next generation.

Paul Bérenger may see reform as his final “véritable combat,” and Navin Ramgoolam may see it as a strategic piece on a larger chessboard. But for the citizen, the electoral system is the bedrock of social peace. We must guard against the “mirage of reform” — the idea that changing the rules will automatically improve the quality of governance. Until there is a genuine national consensus that transcends party lines and communal anxieties, the most “sensible” path is one of extreme caution. Stability is too high a price to pay for political expediency.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 16 January 2026