The Evolving Crisis: Electoral Reform and Political Self-Interest

Editorial

The recent political tremors within the Alliance du Changement government — culminating in the reported threat by the leader of the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM), Paul Bérenger, to resign — have momentarily subsided. After what were described as two decisive meetings, the tension between Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam and his Deputy has been “defused,” and the immediate crisis of government stability averted. Yet, the underlying fault lines remain. In our view, the real issue of discord points directly to the thorny issue of electoral reform, with the other matters canvassed by the MMM leader being merely a diversion from this single, central political goal.

According to those close to the ruling alliance, the MMM leader’s real concern was the Prime Minister’s perceived reluctance to commit to the electoral overhaul that suits the MMM’s interests, eclipsing any other ministerial friction. For the MMM leader, who has championed this cause for decades, the government’s promise of reform must be a credible path to implementation, not just a political talking point. The crisis was thus less about present governance and more about securing the MMM’s future through a proper reform from the Prime Minister.

Party Interest vs. National Interest

It is a truism that we should not be against electoral reform simply for the sake of opposition. A nation’s political architecture demands periodic maintenance to ensure its continued fitness for purpose. Indeed, the government’s stated aim to consult the public on a system “adapted to the 21st century” and “corresponding to the aspirations of all Mauritians” is laudable. However, the Mauritian history of constitutional change teaches one indelible lesson: every proposed reform is viewed through the prism of political self-interest before it is judged on national merit.

The MMM’s specific agenda — like that of most parties advocating reform — is the introduction of a measure of Proportional Representation (PR). This is not altruistic; it is a calculated political necessity. Mauritius’s current hybrid system of First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) supplemented by the Best Loser System (BLS) is often criticized for producing disproportionate results. It consistently produces “sweep” results — like the historic 60-0 scores — where the winning coalition secures a massive parliamentary majority with only a narrow lead in the national popular vote.

For a party like the MMM, which has seen its national vote share diluted into political irrelevance under FPTP, a dose of PR is survival. It would guarantee a significant, permanent presence in the National Assembly, securing both influence and a clear opposition function, regardless of whether it is in government or out. The reluctance of any leader of a dominant party, to accelerate such a reform is therefore understandable: introducing PR directly translates to diluting their own power and ceding seats to the opposition, thereby reducing the scale and ease of their parliamentary majorities.

The Reality of the Reform Timeline

The recent, brief political crisis and its “resolution” might wrongly suggest that major reform is about to happen. This is highly unlikely, and perhaps even desirable, given that the timeline for such a complex undertaking is measured in years, not months — a reality often overlooked by the political class.

International best practice and the Mauritian context underscore the difficulty:

* Review and Drafting Phase (Years): While the government can fast-track a consultation paper, the entire history of Mauritian reform — from the Sachs Commission (2002) to the Carcassonne Report (2011) — spans over two decades without a breakthrough. The issue is not the lack of technical reports, but the political consensus required to move forward.

* Legislative Approval (Years): A major constitutional amendment, required for electoral reform, demands a daunting three-quarters majority in the National Assembly. This single, high hurdle gives the opposition or a dissenting coalition partner immense blocking power, leading to what analysts call “power-sharing immobilism.”

* Implementation Buffer (Minimum 12-18 Months): Even if a law were passed tomorrow, the Electoral Commission needs at least a year and a half to revise rolls, train staff, and educate voters on a fundamentally new system.

The current announcement of forthcoming public consultations is a step, but it is merely the opening move in a protracted political game. Given the complexity, the fact that reform has been a recurring stalemate since the pre-independence era shows that it is not a quick fix to a political spat, but a generational challenge.

The Enduring Constitutional Challenge

A proper reform is not merely about adding a few PR seats; it requires resolving the enduring challenge of the Best Loser System (BLS). The BLS, which allocates up to eight seats to unreturned candidates from underrepresented communities, was the essential compromise that guaranteed minority representation and allowed for independence in 1968.

However, the BLS is now seen by many as a constitutional anomaly:

1. It institutionalizes communalism by requiring every candidate to declare their community (Hindu, Muslim, Sino-Mauritian, General Population), which critics argue runs counter to national unity.
2. It faces legal challenges for allegedly violating the constitutional guarantee of non-discrimination.

Any reform that introduces PR inevitably involves a trade-off with the BLS. Minority groups, particularly the General Population and the Muslim community, fear that abolishing the BLS without a guaranteed mechanism for their representation under a new PR system would leave them politically exposed. This trade-off — retaining community representation while improving proportionality — is the deep-seated dilemma that has been the true reason for the stalemate for decades.

The Path Forward: Doing What is Best for the Country

We should only undertake a reform if it is a proper one, meticulously designed after a thorough examination of all details, and demonstrably acting in the best interest of the entire nation, not just particular political parties. A proper electoral reform initiative must therefore be broad and go beyond the mere addition of PR seats to satisfy the MMM’s proportional aspirations.

It must encompass genuine democratisation:

* Equal Franchise: Address the significant discrepancies in constituency sizes to better adhere to the principle of “one person, one vote.”

* Party Democratisation: Introduce measures to make political parties more internally democratic and accountable to their members.

* Transparency and Finance: Mandate financial transparency and curtail the pervasive and often corrosive influence of financiers and big business on political decision-making and public policy formulation.

The Constitution of Mauritius, for all its imperfections, has served the nation well, allowing for stability and relative communal harmony since independence. It should not be tampered with merely to suit the narrow, short-term interests of parties that may be losing favour with the electorate.

Electoral reform is not the exclusive preserve of politicians. The government is right to commit to a broad consultation exercise. But this must be genuine, including the input of municipal and district councils, civil society, youth, and the elderly. If the government’s consultations are merely a hollow exercise leading to the implementation of a politically expedient, hastily constructed amendment intended to appease a coalition partner, they risk damaging the stability of the Constitution without achieving the fundamental fairness the nation truly needs. Such an initiative is ultimately doomed to fail, joining the long list of previous attempts that have stalled due to a lack of genuine consensus.

The true test of leadership lies not in defusing a cabinet crisis, but in building the national consensus required to strengthen the foundation of Mauritian democracy for the next fifty years.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 21 November 2025