“The British government does not agree with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination report…

… CERD does not speak on behalf of the UN, or of UN Member states’

Interview: David Snoxell, Coordinator of the All-Party Parliamentary Group

* ‘It may be that in time the US will agree to resettlement in Diego Garcia. It was shown by the KPMG study in 2015 to be feasible’

* ‘Sovereignty is a touchstone for those who want to hang on to every last rock of the British Empire’

In this week’s interview, David Snoxell, former British High Commissioner to Mauritius and Coordinator of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Chagos Islands, speaks with Mauritius Times on the final, tumultuous stages of the Mauritius-UK Chagos Treaty and the accompanying Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) Bill. David Snoxell addresses the persistent — and often heated — opposition from a section of the UK political class, including the Conservative Opposition, as the deal moves through Parliament. He provides insights into the complex and protracted nature of UK parliamentary procedure and why it has slowed the Bill’s passage; the motives behind the Conservative “rearguard action,” dismissing it as a strategic, party-political attack rather than a genuine security concern; the international consensus supporting the treaty, contrasting it with the “last rock of the British Empire” rhetoric used by opponents… Finally, D. Snoxell discusses the future of the Chagos Archipelago, its significance in international law following the ICJ opinion, and how the ratified treaty will normalize the UK’s global position while safeguarding the vital US/UK military base on Diego Garcia.

Mauritius Times: To outsiders, the parliamentary process in Britain for approving significant legislation — such as the Mauritius-UK Chagos treaty — often appears long-winded and tedious. Why does it have to be so complex?

David Snoxell: The passage of legislation through Parliament has evolved down the centuries. There is certainly a case for making it faster and less cumbersome. That would be a major constitutional reform and take several years to achieve agreement between members and parties. The size of Parliament (650 in the Commons, 820 in the Lords) is also a major concern which Governments continue to address.

* The significant opposition within the House of Commons and the House of Lords to the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Treaty and Bill, coupled with outspoken criticism from figures like Priti Patel, indicates what many commentators are calling a rearguard action from a section of the political class in the UK. Is all this a genuine attempt to reverse the policy, or is it a strategic move to establish a clear ideological dividing line for future political gain?

The Bill could by now have been enacted and the treaty ratified had the previous Conservative Government, which started negotiations with Mauritius in November 2022 that were originally due to conclude in February 2023, not taken so long about it. An election in the UK also delayed the negotiations towards the end of 11 rounds, but when Labour came into office in July 2024, it immediately resumed negotiations. Elections in the US and Mauritius further delayed signing of the treaty until 22 May this year. The process of ratification and a Bill to implement the treaty in domestic legislation was introduced in July and is now with the House of Lords.

Although there are still Conservative parliamentarians who support the treaty, the new Conservative Opposition appears to have abandoned the policy of their predecessors and has been attempting to stop the treaty being ratified and delay the Bill. ‘Rearguard action’ is not the right word. It is more concerted action for party political purposes. Attacking the government in power is seen as the duty of the Loyal Opposition!

* That opposition group appears to believe strongly that the current policy is damaging and that any concession to Mauritian sovereignty poses a grave threat to security and Western interests in the Indo-Pacific. Is this assessment justified?

Since the election, these are typical arguments deployed by those opposed to the treaty; however, they are not the views of President Trump and his Administration, nearly all UN Member States, the Commonwealth, the EU, the African Union, or the British Government.

Sovereignty is a touchstone for those who want to hang on to every last rock of the British Empire that is still controlled by the UK. Terms like ‘surrender’, ‘betrayal’, and ‘China threat’ are deployed to keep the flag flying over the British Indian Ocean Territory. This territory is only 60 years old and, since 1968, has not been British except by name. Clearly, some politicians see Chagos as a means of attacking the government and its commitment to international law.

* A hardline stance on protecting the military base and what is considered “UK sovereignty” would appeal directly to a core, traditional segment of voters. But do such issues resonate with the British public at large, or are most people more concerned with everyday bread and butter matters?

It is difficult to gauge public opinion which is largely moulded by what it is told by the media. Many news outlets have waged a campaign, often driven by party political considerations, against a settlement with Mauritius.

I think it fair to say that most British people still do not know where BIOT/Chagos is and even if they could locate it on the map would know little about its complex history, heritage and people.

Obviously, voters are more concerned with domestic and economic issues than international affairs. Foreign affairs are mostly ignored in election campaigns.

* With the British government firmly behind the treaty, and with international support and diplomatic pressure, it appears unlikely that Conservative resistance particularly regarding the cost — the £3.4 billion vs £35 billion debate — and the perceived security risks linked to Mauritius’s relationship with China or the unfounded allegations by the Opposition against Mauritius over the House of Lords survey of Chagossian views, could derail the Mauritius-UK deal through parliamentary mechanisms. But is this confidence justified, or premature?

The way of delaying a Bill is to keep tabling amendments. Over 80 have so far been tabled to the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill, which is not that many when compared with the Assisted Dying Bill with over 1100 amendments.

Another way is allegations. The latest, from Priti Patel (Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary) is that Mauritius interfered with the Survey of Chagossian views, commissioned recently by the House of Lords and being conducted by its International Relations and Defence Committee (IRDC).

A response from Olivier Bancoult on behalf of the Chagos Refugees Group condemned the allegation as “unfounded” and set the record straight. The Foreign Minister of Mauritius also responded. In the UK Parliament a Foreign Office Minister has stated that “We have no evidence of Mauritian interference”.

The Survey, which must be concluded by 18 December, has unintentionally provided ammunition to those who are looking for evidence to denigrate Mauritius. I doubt its conclusions will be affected by such irresponsible allegations against an ally and friendly member of the Commonwealth or that those peers who support the treaty and the bill will be deterred. It is disappointing to see the good name of Mauritius besmirched in this way.

* What is the status of the resettlement programme and the UK-backed trust fund? Some Chagossians and their representatives have rejected the deal outright, arguing that without a guaranteed right of return — especially to Diego Garcia — and without firm commitments on resettlement or reparations, the agreement merely reaffirms their displacement. How likely is it that these concerns will influence the implementation of the agreement?

On 2 December, in answer to a Question, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office Minister told the Lords that a statement would be made ahead of ratification on eligibility for resettlement and the modalities of the Chagossian Trust Fund and that: “We continue to discuss the details of the Trust Fund with Mauritius.”

She also noted that: “The first meeting of the Chagossian Contact Group took place on 2 September. The Contact Group will continue to meet quarterly as part of wider engagement between the UK Government and Chagossian representatives, and we will continue to discuss ways that engagement may be enhanced. Currently, the Group is made up of two representatives from each of the following groups: Chagossian Voices, UK Chagos Refugees Group, Chagos Islanders Movement, Chagos Refugees Group (Mauritius), Association Chagossiens de France, and Seychellois Chagossians Committee.”

It is too soon to talk about a resettlement programme. Under the treaty, Mauritius alone has responsibility for resettlement and there is therefore no need for a UK Bill to include reference to this. Nonetheless, resettlement will no doubt remain under discussion by the UK Government with Mauritius and the Chagossians for a long time to come. But we should also be realistic. Most Chagossians will prefer to remain where they have made new lives in Mauritius, Seychelles, UK, France, Canada, even Switzerland but they will all want their right to return to their islands restored and to visit whenever they choose.

It may be that in time the US will agree to resettlement in Diego Garcia. It was shown by the KPMG study in 2015 to be feasible, but it needs to be handled sensitively, first with organised visits which the UK has agreed to, and later when there has been a successful resettlement on the Outer Islands. Not everything can be decided immediately. But I have every confidence that the interests of the Chagossians will be safeguarded.

* At the end of the day, what factors will ultimately determine if the deal goes through, and what is the current assessment of its chances?

We shall know the answer to that question if the Bill goes through unamended next month and becomes law. There are discussions going on between peers of the three parties as to outstanding amendments. It is possible that there will be an agreed amendment incorporated into the Bill. It will then become law on 7 January, receive Royal Assent and the treaty ratified. My money is on the Bill going through.

* Assuming that the Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) Bill goes through and the treaty is ratified early next year, what happens next?

From the moment that the treaty is ratified by both governments, the UK formally recognises that Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Islands. The detailed arrangements to ‘transfer’ the territory can then begin. Unwinding 60 years of British control will be administratively complicated. It will take time.

Diego Garcia and the base will carry on in the same way it always has done under the 99-year lease to be granted by Mauritius. There will be ongoing consultations and meetings to smooth the transition and planning the way forward.

The Chagos Archipelago Marine Protected Area (CAMPA) will become the future basis for conservation of the living resources and the UK has undertaken to support it and provide scientific advice. Chagossians are already represented by Olivier Bancoult on the CAMPA committee.

* How might the final form of the treaty and legislation be interpreted in international law, particularly in relation to the 2019 ICJ advisory opinion and the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the UK to end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago? Will ratification expose the UK to renewed legal scrutiny or help regularise its position?

The ratified treaty will be registered with the UN Treaty Section in New York and become part of international treaty law. I would expect the UK and Mauritius to sponsor a joint resolution at the UN General Assembly in September next year commending the treaty, with no doubt many speeches hailing it as a triumph of diplomacy and international law that at last meets the requirements of UNGA resolutions going back to 1965, and more recently 2019.

Besides the treaty and its attachments, there will be exchanges of letters and notes with Mauritius on technical issues for the foreseeable future just as there have been between the UK and US since their 1966 Agreement.

* The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has just called on the UK not to ratify the Treaty. What do you make of that?

The British government does not agree with the CERD report. CERD is an independent body of experts that does not speak on behalf of the UN, or of UN Member states. The UN Secretary General and the African Union chairs have both welcomed the Agreement with Mauritius.

I do not see any likelihood of either party being prepared to go back to the drawing board to renegotiate the treaty. Negotiations on the treaty were between the UK and Mauritius with the priority being to secure the operation of the joint UK/US base on Diego Garcia, which is vital to UK national security.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 12 December 2025