Reckless Power and the Cost to Global Order

We are not yet in a global conflict of the kind history has known. But we are in a phase where the guardrails that once moderated behaviour are under strain

Opinion

By Vijay Makhan

When unpredictability becomes a governing method at the apex of global power, instability ceases to be episodic. It becomes systemic — weakening institutions, unsettling alliances, and exposing smaller states to risks not of their making.

There are moments in international relations when events accumulate faster than reflection. This is one such moment. Yet, what is most striking today is not the multiplicity of crises, but the growing centrality of one factor — the erratic and unpredictable exercise of power at the highest level.

Unpredictability in statecraft is not new. It has, at times, been used deliberately as a tactical instrument. But when it becomes habitual — when it substitutes for strategy rather than complements it — it ceases to be an asset. It becomes a source of systemic risk.

Under the current US administration, this distinction appears increasingly blurred. Foreign policy is marked less by continuity than by oscillation and is conducted via social media. Positions shift abruptly. Allies are alternately reassured and rebuked. Adversaries are threatened, then unexpectedly engaged. Commitments appear provisional, whimsical, subject to recalibration in real time.

This is not strategic ambiguity. It is volatility elevated to method.

From volatility to erosion of order

The consequences extend beyond diplomatic discomfort. They affect the architecture of international relations itself. The United States has long been a central pillar of the post-war order — anchored in the United Nations system, reinforced through alliances such as NATO, and underpinned by a network of economic and security arrangements. That role required not perfection, but predictability and consistency.

Today, that foundation appears increasingly unsettled. Multilateral institutions are treated with scepticism, at times open disdain. Commitments to collective security are questioned in transactional terms. Alliances are measured against immediate returns rather than shared strategic purpose.

Language, too, has shifted. Public threats of overwhelming force, delivered in stark and sometimes theatrical and foul terms, sit uneasily with the discipline traditionally associated with statecraft. Statements suggesting the “obliteration” and “death of a civilisation”, even when followed by expressions of goodwill, introduce a dissonance that is difficult to reconcile with responsible leadership. Such rhetoric does not merely inflame; it erodes the normative boundaries that have, however imperfectly, restrained escalation.

The recent crisis involving Iran illustrates this dynamic. The announcement of a temporary ceasefire may provide a pause. But it does not obscure the manner in which escalation was framed or communicated. Nor does it diminish the broader concern: that the use of force, or the threat thereof, is increasingly articulated without the restraint and clarity that international stability demands. This is, in effect, a war whose consequences are imposed upon the wider international community — carrying economic and strategic costs far beyond its immediate theatre.

What may be presented as a demonstration of resolve, even as a form of success, warrants closer scrutiny. What is claimed as strength risks revealing something more consequential: escalation followed by improvised de-escalation, at significant cost to credibility. Allies are unsettled, institutions bypassed, norms diluted. In the process, what is presented as victory begins to resemble erosion — of standing, of trust and of the capacity to lead through legitimacy rather than pressure.

Institutions under strain, smaller states at risk

Developments within the United States itself have taken on added significance. What might once have been dismissed as political noise now reflects a deeper institutional unease. Voices within the President’s own party have broken ranks, while elements within the opposition have gone further, openly questioning the exercise of judgment at the highest level of office.

The 25th Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides for the removal of a President is being referred to openly.

Such discussions are not to be taken lightly. They reflect, not partisan impulse alone, but a deeper concern about whether established safeguards are adequate to the moment. They underscore a broader point: that institutions matter most precisely when they are tested.

At the international level, a draft Security Council resolution was blocked through the exercise of the veto — an outcome that, while not unprecedented, is nonetheless revealing. It underscores the strain on multilateral processes. Equally telling was the abstention of Pakistan, even as it prepares to host negotiations in the coming weeks — an illustration of the delicate and at times paradoxical positioning of states navigating an increasingly fractured geopolitical landscape.

The implications for the wider world are significant. When the conduct of the leading power appears inconsistent, other states adjust accordingly. Markets factor in risk. Governments diversify exposure. Strategic partners hedge. The cumulative effect is fragmentation.

For smaller states, the consequences are more acute. Stability in the international system is not an abstraction; it is a prerequisite for economic planning, security and development. When predictability weakens, vulnerability increases.

The Indian Ocean region offers a clear illustration. It sits at the intersection of key maritime routes, energy flows and emerging strategic competition. Developments in the Gulf reverberate through shipping lanes. Instability in the Red Sea alters trade patterns. Increased military presence heightens the risk of miscalculation. In such a context, the margin for error narrows significantly.

Issues grounded in international law are not immune. The question of the Chagos Archipelago, for instance, has been authoritatively addressed through the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and subsequent endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly. Yet, its practical resolution continues to be shaped by political considerations that, at times, appear detached from established legal principles. This disjunction between law and practice is itself symptomatic of a broader drift.

The central issue, therefore, is not the personality of any one leader, but the effect of leadership style on systemic stability. A great power can absorb misjudgments. It cannot indefinitely sustain the erosion of credibility.

When credibility weakens, relationships become transactional. When relationships become transactional, coercion begins to displace consent. And when coercion becomes routine, escalation becomes more likely — not always by intent, but by accumulation.

We are not yet in a global conflict of the kind history has known. But we are in a phase where the guardrails that once moderated behaviour are under strain. In such circumstances, restraint is not weakness. It is the condition for stability.

If unpredictability continues to define the exercise of power at the highest level, the question will not be whether the system can adapt — but how much instability it will be forced to absorb before it begins to fracture.

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Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 10 April 2026

Tags:Adversaries, Alliances, Collective Security, Cost to Global Order, Credibility, Escalation, Foreign Policy, Fragmentation, institutions, Mauritius Times, Multilateral Institutions, Reckless Power, Rhetoric, Stability, Statecraft, Systemic Risk, Unpredictability, US Administration, Vijay Makhan, Volatility