Recalibrating Power in Asia

London Letter

In a region shaped by India’s expanding naval role, China’s widening footprint and a more selective American engagement, Mauritius’s leverage lies in credible maritime governance, blue-economy development, secure port infrastructure and digital resilience

By Shyam Bhatia

Is Mauritius beginning to feel a quiet recalibration of international power, not through dramatic announcements or visible withdrawals, but through subtler shifts in attention, priorities and presence across the Indian Ocean?

For a small island state whose prosperity depends on secure sea lanes, predictable trade routes and a stable maritime balance, such shifts matter. They are felt not in summit declarations but in shipping costs, port traffic, insurance premiums and the quiet movement of naval forces beyond the horizon. The United States’ new National Security Strategy (NSS), released in early December, suggests that such a recalibration is under way.

Buried in the document’s 33 pages is a clear signal: Washington is narrowing its focus. The Indo-Pacific is no longer treated as the central organising framework of American strategy, and China is recast not as an ideological or civilisational adversary but as a competitor to be managed. This is less a rupture than a clarification, a stripping away of rhetoric that reveals a more selective, interest-driven American posture.

For India, long described as an indispensable Indo-Pacific partner, the implications are significant. For Mauritius, positioned astride vital shipping lanes linking Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the consequences are quieter but no less real.

Early in the NSS, Washington declares that the era in which the United States sustained the global order by default has come to an end. American power, it argues, must now be applied with “discipline and focus”. Commitments once assumed in Asian capitals are being pruned, not dramatically abandoned, but carefully narrowed.

The strategy places overwhelming emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, stating unambiguously: “The United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of our security and prosperity.” Domestic industrial strength, border control and economic resilience now take precedence over extended overseas entanglements.

For the Indian Ocean region, this signals a United States that remains engaged but is less inclined to act as a standing security guarantor. For Mauritius, this reinforces a long-standing reality: regional stability will increasingly depend on regional actors rather than distant assurances.

The NSS’s softened language on China reinforces this trend. After two decades of framing Beijing as the defining strategic challenge of the 21st century, the document now describes China primarily as a major economic competitor, explicitly rejecting the notion of a global ideological struggle. This does not imply American disengagement from Asia, but it does suggest a shift away from military underwriting towards lower-cost diplomacy and selective engagement.

In this context, arrangements such as the Quad — linking India, the United States, Japan and Australia — remain relevant, but they no longer sit at the centre of Washington’s strategic worldview. The US-India partnership is likely to endure, but in a more transactional form, focused on technology, trade and supply chains rather than expansive geopolitical alignment.

For Mauritius, the implications are indirect but important. A more restrained American posture means that the balance of power in the Indian Ocean will be shaped increasingly by resident actors. As China’s naval footprint expands from Djibouti to Gwadar, and as India assumes greater responsibility for maritime stability, smaller states must navigate a more crowded and competitive environment while preserving strategic autonomy.

The NSS also takes a firmer line on burden-sharing, making clear that the United States will no longer assume responsibilities that partners are capable of managing themselves. Automatic guarantees are discouraged; regional self-reliance is encouraged. This approach aligns with India’s growing maritime role but also underscores the need for Indian Ocean states to invest in diplomacy, maritime awareness and economic resilience.

Pakistan, while not central to the document, illustrates this recalibration. A US strategy grounded in domestic priorities offers Islamabad little of the leverage it once enjoyed during the Afghanistan years. Recent American courtesies towards Pakistan’s military leadership are best read as tactical gestures designed to keep channels open, not as signs of renewed strategic centrality.

At the same time, the NSS opens opportunities. Its emphasis on economic security, resilient supply chains and technological cooperation aligns with India’s priorities and has spill-over benefits for Indian Ocean states. Port infrastructure, undersea cables, digital connectivity and maritime domain awareness are areas where Mauritius has a direct stake.

For Mauritius, the recalibration outlined in the NSS sharpens rather than diminishes strategic relevance. As a small island state with a vast Exclusive Economic Zone, a major transshipment port at Port Louis, and growing importance as a node for undersea cables and digital traffic across the Indian Ocean, its interests are inherently maritime. In a region shaped by India’s expanding naval role, China’s widening footprint and a more selective American engagement, Mauritius’s leverage lies in credible maritime governance, blue-economy development, secure port infrastructure and digital resilience.

The task ahead is not alignment, but positioning: sustaining stability, protecting sea-borne commerce and anchoring itself as a rules-based, dependable hub in a more contested oceanic order.

London, December 16, 2025

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 19 December 2025