Leverage Over Law: Doha and the Erosion of Trade Multilateralism

When tariffs are weaponised and rules reduced to convenience, multilateralism does not merely weaken — it yields to leverage, and leverage rarely favours the smallest

Opinion

By Vijay Makhan

The World Trade Organisation was conceived as the institutional anchor of universal trade. Its objective was straightforward: regulate global commerce through enforceable multilateral rules and reduce reliance on proliferating bilateral arrangements. Universality was meant to temper asymmetry. Predictability was meant to replace leverage.

Yet the evolution has been quite the reverse. As multilateral negotiations stalled, bilateralism multiplied. Power, not predictability, increasingly shapes outcomes.

Activists of NGO’s demonstrate the Doha Round before the closing ceremony of the 7th WTO ministerial meeting in Geneva. Pic – Reuters

The Doha Development Round, launched in 2001 and intended to conclude within three years, was presented as the “development round.” Its ambition was to rebalance the system in favour of equity and meaningful market access. A quarter of a century later, it has receded into diplomatic obscurity. Development was promised, paralysis prevailed.

The warning signs were visible earlier.

The failure of the Seattle and Cancún Meetings

As a Deputy Secretary General of the OAU, then Commissioner of the African Union during the transition period, I led the OAU/AU delegations to the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 and to Cancún in 2003. At Seattle, procedural imbalance was impossible to ignore. Many African delegations were effectively excluded from decisive consultations while a limited group shaped the draft declaration through what became known as the “Green Room” process. Decisions affecting the many were being negotiated by the few.

It was largely at the insistence of the African constituency that the final declaration was not endorsed. Caribbean and Asian partners aligned with that position. The stand was not one of obstruction; it was a reminder that multilateralism cannot be selective in its process and still claim legitimacy in its outcome.

Cancún exposed deeper structural tensions. Agricultural subsidies continued to distort global markets, rendering meaningful market access for African producers elusive. While developing countries were urged to liberalise, subsidised exports from advanced economies undercut competitive producers across Africa. The imbalance was measurable in both lost opportunities and constrained growth.

Simultaneously, the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ — investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation — were advanced despite persistent reservations among developing members which already were mired in the complexity of what was on the agenda since the beginning of the negotiations. The African Union, the ACP Group and Least Developed Countries joined forces under what became known as the G90. That coalition emerged from necessity. Cancún faltered because the asymmetry of priorities proved unsustainable.

Those experiences underscored two enduring truths: when developing states coordinate effectively, they can influence negotiating dynamics; when cohesion weakens, marginalisation resumes.

Coordination

The issue of coordination extended beyond individual ministerials. After the Singapore inaugural meeting in December 1996, I sought to secure at least observer status for the OAU — and later the AU — within the WTO framework to facilitate coherence and structured articulation of common African positions. That effort met resistance. Limited and selective access has since been granted on an ad hoc basis, but institutionalised participation remains constrained. Without structured coordination, leverage diminishes.

The failure of Doha must therefore be seen not merely as institutional paralysis, but as the cumulative effect of imbalance and uneven strategic alignment. Multilateralism does not automatically deliver equity; it provides the arena in which equity can be pursued — if political will and cohesion are sustained.

For Small Island Developing States — and for Mauritius in particular — this is not abstract. Mauritius has long depended on predictable market access, enforceable commitments, and a stable trading architecture. Its economic model — services, export diversification, integration into global value chains — rests on legal certainty rather than scale.

When dispute-settlement mechanisms weaken, deterrence weakens. When development negotiations stall, structural disadvantages persist. When bilateral deals proliferate, asymmetry re-enters through differentiated leverage.

Trade without trust becomes transactional.

The global economy is entering a period of strategic fragmentation. Industrial policy is reasserted. Supply chains are reshaped by geopolitical alignment. Environmental and technological standards increasingly intersect with competitive positioning. Without an effective multilateral framework, the boundary between legitimate regulation and disguised protectionism blurs.

For small economies, that ambiguity carries disproportionate risk.

Bilateral agreements offer flexibility, and Mauritius has shown agility in pursuing them. But bilateralism cannot substitute for universality. It multiplies complexity, increases compliance burdens, and entrenches disparities. A functioning multilateral system, however imperfect, offers neutrality — a space where even smaller actors can invoke rules rather than depend on influence.

Fragmentation weakens leverage. Divergence dilutes bargaining power. Developing states that negotiate separately secure separate — and often inferior — outcomes. Concerted positions, consistently articulated, remain the only viable counterweight to structural asymmetry.

The Doha Round’s quiet disappearance is more than procedural drift. It signals erosion of confidence in collective rule-making. As confidence erodes, unilateral measures gain legitimacy. Retaliation replaces adjudication. Trade policy becomes an extension of strategic rivalry.

The WTO was meant to universalise trade governance. If it recedes into managed fragmentation, the balance of advantage shifts accordingly.

And in such a landscape, it is rarely the smallest who determine the terms.

When tariffs are weaponised and rules reduced to convenience, multilateralism does not merely weaken — it yields to leverage, and leverage rarely favours the smallest.

Vijay Makhan

18 Feb 2026

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 20 February 2026