“In Mauritius, a PRB report can create a legitimate expectation that its recommendations will be implemented promptly and predictably”

Qs & As

Public Sector Pay, Protocol, and Constitutional Principles

* ‘Recognising State Protocol in the Constitution would safeguard its neutrality and continuity, preventing its manipulation for partisan or political purposes’

By Lex

In this week’s Qs & As, Lex addresses key questions concerning the Pay Research Bureau (PRB), public sector remuneration, and the protocol ranking of high offices in Mauritius. The discussion examines the legal and administrative framework governing PRB recommendations, their implementation, and the potential implications for public officers’ legitimate expectations. It also explores the constitutional and statutory dimensions of the Table of Precedence, including the balance between the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary, the scope for judicial review, and measures to protect State Protocol from political manipulation. The analysis seeks to clarify how administrative practice, constitutional principles, and statutory mechanisms interact to safeguard both the dignity of officeholders and the effective functioning of government institutions.

* Unlike statutory bodies which are created by a specific Act of Parliament, the Pay Research Bureau (PRB) was established as a department under the aegis of the PMO in 1977. Is it correct to say that its reports are technically recommendations to the Government, which can accept, reject, or vary the recommendations, or even stagger its implementation as seen with the 2026 report?

The PRB is responsible for the continuous review of pay and grading structures and conditions of service in the public sector (the Civil Service, parastatal and other statutory bodies, local authorities, and the Rodrigues Regional Assembly), as well as in private secondary schools. Once the Bureau submits its report, the Government examines the recommendations and, upon approval — typically by Cabinet — proceeds with their implementation, at which point they take effect across the public sector.

* Given that the PRB 2026 report was officially tabled and approved by Cabinet, does the decision to stagger the payments (50% in 2026 and 100% in 2027) constitute a breach of the ‘legitimate expectation’ of public officers under administrative law?

In the Mauritian public sector context, a PRB report may indeed give rise to a legitimate expectation among public officers that its recommendations will be implemented within a reasonable and predictable timeframe. This expectation is particularly strong in relation to revised pay and grading structures, allowances, and career progression, especially once the report has been officially approved by Cabinet.

* Does the Cabinet’s approval of the 2026 Report convert the PRB’s ‘recommendations’ into a ‘binding debt’ that the State cannot legally stagger without paying interest or arrears?

The Cabinet’s approval of the PRB 2026 Report effectively converts its recommendations into Government policy. However, implementation has been phased, with only 50% payable as from January 2026 and full implementation taking effect in January 2027. As a result, the measures acquire binding force progressively, with retroactive payment occurring in stages rather than crystallising immediately as a single lump-sum debt.

Cabinet accepted the PRB’s findings on pay structures for public sector employees, but due to the challenging fiscal situation, their implementation is being phased, creating a binding commitment to future payments rather than an immediate debt obligation.

* The Report reduced the General Worker to Permanent Secretary ratio from 1:6.2 to 1:5.4. Is there a legal threshold where ‘pay compression’ becomes a ‘de-facto’ demotion for high-ranking officials?

There is no specific or universal legal threshold (such as a fixed percentage of pay reduction) at which pay compression automatically amounts to a de facto demotion. Whether it is legally characterised as a demotion — or gives rise to a related claim such as constructive dismissal — depends on the particular circumstances, including the terms of the employment contract, the nature and impact of the changes, and the applicable employment laws.

* For offices like the DPP, the Electoral Commissioner or the Commissioner of Police, whose independence is constitutionally protected, can a PRB recommendation that compresses their salary ratio relative to the General Worker (1:6.7) be viewed as an indirect attempt to diminish the status and independence of their office?

Yes, the salaries of judges and the Director of Public Prosecutions in Mauritius, like other government pay scales, may be subject to compression.

However, it should be noted that holders of many constitutional offices receive substantial allowances and enjoy a high degree of job security, which tends to offset concerns about pay compression — concerns that more commonly arise in the context of recruiting and retaining highly skilled professionals.

* On the other hand, the remuneration of high-ranking government officials — such as the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice, Ministers, and Ambassadors — directly affects the status and dignity of the offices they hold. Under which specific Act of Parliament is the current Table of Precedence (Protocol List) established? Is it solely a prerogative of the Prime Minister/Cabinet, or is it governed by clear statutory provisions?

The protocol establishing the order of precedence of high officials in Mauritius is a formal, largely ceremonial hierarchy used for state occasions and official functions. The President ranks first as Head of State, followed by the Prime Minister as Head of Government.

The order generally reflects constitutional hierarchy and established custom. It includes offices such as the Vice-President, Deputy Prime Minister, Chief Justice, Speaker of the National Assembly, former Presidents and Prime Ministers, Ministers, and the Leader of the Opposition.

* How should protocol reflect the balance between the Judiciary, the Executive, and the Legislature? Does ranking a Senior Minister above the Chief Justice or the Speaker of the House create a constitutional imbalance or undermine the principle of Separation of Powers?

The ranking of a Senior Minister above the Chief Justice or the Speaker in an Order of Precedence is generally a matter of protocol and political hierarchy and does not, in itself, create a constitutional imbalance or undermine the principle of separation of powers.

* At present, the Table of Precedence in Mauritius functions largely as an executive instrument. If an official is downgraded in the protocol list by an incoming government, could this be challenged through judicial review on grounds of irrationality or “détournement de pouvoir”?

Yes, a decision by an incoming government to downgrade an official in the protocol list constitutes an administrative act by a public authority and may be challenged by way of judicial review. The core function of judicial review is to ensure that public bodies act lawfully, rationally, and without abuse of power.

* What legal principles should govern the alignment of protocol between the National Assembly (Legislature) and the Cabinet (Executive) so that neither branch appears subordinate to the other, domestically or internationally?

Legal principles such as the separation of powers, robust checks and balances, constitutional clarity of powers, and parliamentary independence ensure that the Legislature and Executive remain distinct yet cooperative. They prevent subordination by defining roles, enabling mutual oversight (e.g., question time, judicial review), and ensuring clear accountability while limiting executive overreach into lawmaking.

Key mechanisms include parliamentary control over executive actions, legislative scrutiny of delegated powers, and the requirement that both branches derive their legitimacy from the people.

* What remedies are available if an incoming government redesigns protocol arrangements to marginalise or exclude constitutional office-holders such as the Leader of the Opposition from official state functions?

Constitutional officeholders who are marginalized or excluded by an incoming government’s redesign of protocol arrangements have several potential remedies, including recourse through domestic courts, political advocacy, and engagement with constitutional review mechanisms. The availability of specific remedies depends largely on the national legal framework, particularly whether the officeholder can demonstrate a concrete legal injury and whether the government has waived sovereign immunity for such challenges.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 24 December 2025