Erratic Power in a Fragile Order

In a fragile order, erratic power does not project strength. It transmits uncertainty. And uncertainty, in an increasingly militarised Indian Ocean, is a risk multiplier

Opinion

By Karma Yogi

The world is not merely turbulent; it is sliding toward strategic disorder. When the leading power governs by improvisation, instability pervades.

Under Donald Trump’s second term, one feature has become unmistakable: there are no permanent friends or allies, only temporary alignments and negotiable positions. Diplomacy is framed as transaction. Alliances are recalculated. Commitments are reversible. What Franklin D. Roosevelt once imagined — a system anchored in institutions, rules and long-term responsibility — appears increasingly dispensable.

“Under Donald Trump’s second term, one feature has become unmistakable: there are no permanent friends or allies, only temporary alignments and negotiable positions. Diplomacy is framed as transaction. Alliances are recalculated. Commitments are reversible. What Franklin D. Roosevelt once imagined — a system anchored in institutions, rules and long-term responsibility — appears increasingly dispensable. The treatment of allies and adversaries alike follows the same script: public rebuke, abrupt reversal, conditional endorsement…”

The treatment of allies and adversaries alike follows the same script: public rebuke, abrupt reversal, conditional endorsement. Strategic partners are admonished in one breath and courted in the next. Adversaries are threatened and then unexpectedly engaged. To wit, the announced visit of Trump to China at the end of March.  Unpredictability has been elevated to governing style.

Even domestic institutions have not been spared. When the United States Supreme Court signaled the anti-constitutionality of executive tariff authority, the response was not sober recalibration but visible irritation and rhetorical defiance. Tariffs — once defended as instruments of economic leverage — were recast as matters of executive prerogative. When judicial constraint is treated as obstruction, the signal extends beyond domestic politics. In international affairs, such messages travel quickly. Financial markets respond with volatility and higher borrowing costs. Governments move to shield their economies from abrupt policy shifts. Allies, unsure of long-term reliability, begin reducing strategic dependence and widening their security options.

Chagos: Misplaced Perception

The Chagos Agreement between the United Kingdom and Mauritius illustrates this drift with particular clarity. A matter grounded in sovereignty, international law and strategic continuity has, since Trump’s return to office, been reframed in overtly tactical terms. At moments, the arrangement has been tolerated for reasons of stability of the base; at others, it has been denounced as weakness. The oscillation suggests less principled reassessment than instrumentalisation.

Yet it must be stated plainly: recent push-and-pull episodes surrounding the Chagos issue may give the superficial impression that the matter is slipping away from Mauritius. That perception is misplaced.

The legal position is not ambiguous. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice affirmed that the decolonisation of Mauritius was not lawfully completed and that the United Kingdom’s continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago is contrary to international law. The subsequent resolution of the United Nations General Assembly reinforced that finding and called for the completion of decolonisation: sovereignty over the Chagos, including Diego Garcia, rests with Mauritius.

The US: A Tenant

The United States is not a sovereign actor there; it operates as a tenant pursuant to arrangements concluded with the administering power. The United Kingdom’s position has been found inconsistent with the law of decolonisation as articulated by the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Political manoeuvres may generate headlines. They do not alter jurisprudence.

What volatility can do, however, is delay compliance. And delay carries cost. When powerful states appear to treat international law as negotiable and law-based advisory opinions as expendable, the erosion is not confined to one territory. It touches the credibility of the broader order they once claimed to defend.

Third World War? Not Yet!

We are not yet in a Third World War. But we are living through the convergence of theatres whose interactions are increasingly systemic:

* The Russia–Ukraine war reshapes European security architecture.
* Iran remains a flashpoint, intersecting with Gulf and Indian Ocean maritime security.
* Gaza reverberates far beyond its geography.
* Yemen affects Red Sea shipping and global trade flows.
* Strategic rivalry with China deepens across technology, supply chains and maritime presence.

These are no longer isolated crises. They form a pattern of competitive escalation.

Chokepoints

The Indian Ocean is increasingly central to this dynamic. It connects the energy arteries of the Gulf, the manufacturing hubs of East Asia and the markets of Africa and Europe. Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz and Malacca are chokepoints whose disruption reverberates globally. Naval deployments intensify. Access agreements multiply. Undersea cables and port infrastructure acquire strategic salience.

For Mauritius, the implications are immediate. The Chagos issue sits at the intersection of sovereignty, maritime security and great-power rivalry. A destabilised Gulf affects shipping costs and insurance premiums. Escalation in the Red Sea alters trade routes. Increased militarisation heightens risks across the region, compounded by the erratic power of the principal security actor in this theatre.

Erosion of Prestige and Moral Authority

A great power can survive policy errors. It cannot indefinitely survive the loss of credibility. When credibility erodes, relationships become transactional, and consent is replaced by coercion. And when coercion becomes routine, conflict becomes more probable.

By the time the present administration concludes its term, the most consequential loss may not be territorial or military. It will surely be the steady erosion of prestige and moral authority that once enabled the United States to lead through legitimacy rather than pressure.

If tariffs are weaponised, treaties rendered provisional, alliances treated as conditional and institutions dismissed as expendable, then multilateralism simply weakens. It is the smaller states that pay the price.

In a fragile order, erratic power does not project strength. It transmits uncertainty. And uncertainty, in an increasingly militarised Indian Ocean, is a risk multiplier.

Beware of the unforgiving verdict of History!

24 February 2026

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 27 February 2026