Chagos, International Law, and the Perils of Political Nostalgia

Opinion

As the UK Parliament resumes consideration of the Chagos agreement, shifting political postures in London and Washington expose a deeper question: will international law and historical redress prevail over nostalgia and procedural obstruction?

By Vijay Makhan

The debate surrounding the UK-Mauritius agreement on the Chagos Archipelago has entered a new and revealing phase. With Donald Trump having publicly reverted to a supportive posture — describing the agreement as the best deal Prime Minister Keir Starmer could realistically obtain — the external strategic objections that briefly dominated the discourse have largely receded. What remains is a test not of law or security, but of political judgment within the United Kingdom.

“The Chagos agreement does not represent capitulation. It represents closure — closure grounded in law, tempered by strategic realism, and responsive to the demands of historical justice. With external objections receding and the legal foundations unshaken, the remaining obstacles are political rather than principled. As the parliamentary process resumes in the United Kingdom, the choice is clear: to allow nostalgia to masquerade as sovereignty, or to recognise that strength in the twenty-first century lies not in clinging to imperial residues, but in having the courage to correct them…”

The agreement itself has not changed. Its essential architecture is clear and balanced: Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago is restored, while the continued operation of the Diego Garcia military base is expressly provided for. This was not a reckless concession but the outcome of prolonged negotiation, reflecting a belated acceptance that colonial-era shenanigans cannot be maintained indefinitely without eroding legal credibility and moral authority.

For Mauritius, the Chagos issue has never been episodic or opportunistic. It has been pursued with consistency and restraint across decades, governments, and diplomatic arenas — at the United Nations, within the Organisation of African Unity and later the African Union, through the Non-Aligned Movement, and in sustained bilateral engagement with the United Kingdom. That long arc of persistence is precisely what gives Mauritius credibility today — and exposes the fragility of claims that the agreement is sudden, impulsive, or ideologically driven.

Washington’s renewed endorsement is particularly instructive. Diego Garcia remains central to Western strategic posture in the Indian Ocean, and nothing in the agreement alters that reality. The argument that legality undermines security is no longer persuasive; it belongs to an earlier and increasingly untenable mode of reasoning.

Attention has therefore returned to the UK Parliament, where the agreement is once again under consideration. Parliamentary scrutiny is legitimate and necessary. But there is an important distinction between scrutiny and obstruction. The current legislative “ping-pong” between the House of Commons and the House of Lords risks blurring that line, particularly where delay appears driven less by identifiable defects in the agreement than by ideological resistance to its underlying premise.

The House of Lords performs an important revising function within the UK’s constitutional architecture. It does not, however, possess a democratic mandate to indefinitely impede a foreign policy decision that has been negotiated by the executive, signed, and broadly welcomed by international partners. When procedure is used to substitute political preference for executive responsibility, constitutional balance gives way to institutional overreach.

Much of the opposition has been articulated through the lens of concern for citizens of Chagossian origin. Their displacement and suffering are beyond dispute, and their voices deserve unwavering respect. Yet the debate has too often been shaped by selective amplification. It remains an established reality that the majority of Chagossians residing in Mauritius and Seychelles support the current agreement, viewing it as a long-delayed pathway toward recognition, reparative measures, and closure. While the opposition mobilized among sections of the UK-based diaspora may hold legitimate perspectives, those views cannot reasonably be treated as singularly representative of the entire community.

A rights-based discourse loses coherence when proximity to Westminster outweighs proximity to the historical injustice itself.

It is in this context that the posture of certain UK political figures warrants reflection. Individuals such as Priti Patel, Kemi Badenoch, and the notably itinerant Andrew Rosindell, now aligned with Reform after crossing from the Conservative benches, are entitled to their political positions. But entitlement does not confer insulation from historical judgment.

There are moments when political actors must decide whether they wish to be remembered as custodians of continuity or as agents of correction. The tide of international law on Chagos is neither transient nor fashionable; it has been cumulative and sustained. To manoeuvre against it now — particularly when the agreement offers a rare opportunity to address a manifest colonial injustice — risks consigning such opposition to the wrong side of history.

There is little dignity in basking in the afterglow of imperial nostalgia when the modern international order has already rendered its verdict.

The Chagos agreement does not represent capitulation. It represents closure — closure grounded in law, tempered by strategic realism, and responsive to the demands of historical justice. With external objections receding and the legal foundations unshaken, the remaining obstacles are political rather than principled.

As the parliamentary process resumes in the United Kingdom, the choice is clear: to allow nostalgia to masquerade as sovereignty, or to recognise that strength in the twenty-first century lies not in clinging to imperial residues, but in having the courage to correct them.

8 February 2026

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 13 February 2026